Juniper NETWORKS SRX1500 Common Criteria Guide Devices User Guide
- June 16, 2024
- JUNIPER NETWORKS
Table of Contents
- SRX1500 Common Criteria Guide Devices
- Product Information
- Specifications
- About This Guide
- Overview
- Understanding the Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration
- Understanding Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation
- Understanding FIPS Mode of Operation Terminology and Supported
- Identifying Secure Product Delivery
- Understanding Management Interfaces
- Understanding Roles and Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of
- Understanding Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of
- Downloading Software Packages from Juniper Networks
- Installing Junos Software Packages
- Understanding Zeroization to Clear System Data for FIPS Mode of
- Loading Firmware on the Device
- How to Enable and Configure Junos OS in FIPS Mode of
- Understanding the Associated Password Rules for an Authorized
- Configuring a Network Device Protection Profile Authorized
- NTP Overview
- Network Time Security (NTS) Support for NTP
- NTP Time Servers
- Configure NTP Time Server and Time Services
- Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Client Mode
- Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Symmetric Active
- Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Broadcast
- Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Server Mode
- Example: Configure NTP as a Single Time Source for Router and
- Synchronize and Coordinate Time Distribution Using NTP
- Q: Are the SRX devices compatible with other Juniper Networks
- Q: Can I upgrade the firmware on the SRX devices without
- Q: How often should I perform zeroization on the SRX
- Q: Can I configure multiple NTP time servers on the SRX
- Q: How can I troubleshoot NTP synchronization issues on the SRX
SRX1500 Common Criteria Guide Devices
Product Information
Specifications
-
Product Name: SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600
Devices -
Published: 2023-12-21
-
Release: 22.2R1
-
Manufacturer: Juniper Networks, Inc.
-
Address: 1133 Innovation Way Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA -
Website: www.juniper.net
About This Guide
This guide provides information on the common criteria evaluated
configuration for the SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600
devices. It covers topics such as understanding the FIPS mode of
operation, configuring roles and authentication methods,
configuring administrative credentials and privileges, and
configuring network time protocol (NTP).
Overview
Understanding the Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration
The common criteria evaluated configuration is a set of security
requirements and specifications that have been independently
evaluated and certified for the SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and
SRX4600 devices. It ensures that the devices meet specific security
standards and can be used in secure environments.
Understanding Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation
The FIPS mode of operation is a security feature that enables
the SRX devices to operate in compliance with the Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS). It provides enhanced
security measures and cryptographic algorithms to protect sensitive
data.
Understanding FIPS Mode of Operation Terminology and Supported
Cryptographic Algorithms
This section explains the terminology used in the FIPS mode of
operation and provides information on the supported cryptographic
algorithms. It helps users understand the security features and
capabilities of the devices.
Identifying Secure Product Delivery
This section guides users on how to identify if the product has
been securely delivered. It covers topics such as tamper-evident
seals and cryptographic modules.
Understanding Management Interfaces
This section provides information on the management interfaces
available on the SRX devices. It explains how to access and
configure these interfaces for device management.
Configuring Roles and Authentication Methods
Understanding Roles and Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of
Operation
This section explains the roles and services available for Junos
OS in the FIPS mode of operation. It helps users understand how to
configure and manage user roles and authentication methods for
secure access to the devices.
Understanding Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of
Operation
This section provides detailed information on the services
available for Junos OS in the FIPS mode of operation. It covers
topics such as SSH, SNMP, and HTTPS, and explains how to configure
and secure these services.
Downloading Software Packages from Juniper Networks
This section guides users on how to download software packages
from Juniper Networks. It provides step-by-step instructions on
accessing the download portal and selecting the appropriate
software packages for the SRX devices.
Installing Junos Software Packages
This section explains the process of installing Junos software
packages on the SRX devices. It covers topics such as verifying
package integrity, transferring packages to the devices, and
initiating the installation process.
Understanding Zeroization to Clear System Data for FIPS Mode of
Operation
Zeroization is a process that clears all system data, including
cryptographic keys and configurations, to ensure data security.
This section explains how to perform zeroization on the SRX devices
in the FIPS mode of operation.
Loading Firmware on the Device
This section provides instructions on how to load firmware on
the SRX devices. It covers topics such as preparing the firmware
image, transferring it to the devices, and initiating the firmware
upgrade process.
How to Enable and Configure Junos OS in FIPS Mode of
Operation
This section guides users on how to enable and configure Junos
OS in the FIPS mode of operation. It covers topics such as setting
the FIPS mode, configuring cryptographic modules, and verifying the
FIPS mode status.
Configuring Administrative Credentials and Privileges
Understanding the Associated Password Rules for an Authorized
Administrator
This section provides information on the password rules
associated with an authorized administrator account. It explains
the requirements for creating strong and secure passwords.
Configuring a Network Device Protection Profile Authorized
Administrator
This section guides users on how to configure a network device
protection profile authorized administrator. It explains the steps
to create an administrator account with the necessary privileges to
manage the SRX devices.
Network Time Protocol
NTP Overview
This section provides an overview of the Network Time Protocol
(NTP) and its importance in maintaining accurate time
synchronization across network devices.
Network Time Security (NTS) Support for NTP
This section explains the Network Time Security (NTS) support
for NTP. It covers the benefits of using NTS and provides
instructions on how to configure NTS for secure time
synchronization.
NTP Time Servers
This section provides information on NTP time servers and their
role in providing accurate time information to network devices. It
explains how to select and configure NTP time servers for the SRX
devices.
Configure NTP Time Server and Time Services
This section guides users on how to configure NTP time servers
and time services on the SRX devices. It covers topics such as
configuring server addresses, enabling authentication, and managing
time synchronization settings.
Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Client Mode
This section provides instructions on how to configure the SRX
devices to operate in client mode for NTP. It explains the steps to
synchronize time with NTP servers.
Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Symmetric Active
Mode
This section explains how to configure the SRX devices to
operate in symmetric active mode for NTP. It covers topics such as
configuring peer addresses and establishing symmetric
associations.
Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Broadcast
Mode
This section guides users on how to configure the SRX devices to
operate in broadcast mode for NTP. It explains the steps to
broadcast time information to other network devices.
Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Server Mode
This section provides instructions on how to configure the SRX
devices to operate in server mode for NTP. It covers topics such as
configuring reference clocks and serving time information to client
devices.
Example: Configure NTP as a Single Time Source for Router and
Switch Clock Synchronization
This section provides an example configuration for using NTP as
a single time source for clock synchronization on the SRX devices.
It explains the steps to configure NTP and verify the clock
synchronization status.
Synchronize and Coordinate Time Distribution Using NTP
This section explains how to synchronize and coordinate time
distribution across network devices using NTP. It covers topics
such as configuring time zones, enabling leap second handling, and
troubleshooting time synchronization issues.
FAQ
Q: Are the SRX devices compatible with other Juniper Networks
products?
A: Yes, the SRX devices are compatible with other Juniper
Networks products. They can be integrated into existing Juniper
Networks infrastructure for enhanced network security.
Q: Can I upgrade the firmware on the SRX devices without
interrupting network connectivity?
A: Yes, the firmware upgrade process on the SRX devices is
designed to minimize network interruptions. However, it is
recommended to schedule firmware upgrades during maintenance
windows to avoid any potential disruptions.
Q: How often should I perform zeroization on the SRX
devices?
A: The frequency of performing zeroization on the SRX devices
depends on the security requirements of your environment. It is
recommended to follow your organization’s security policies and
guidelines regarding zeroization.
Q: Can I configure multiple NTP time servers on the SRX
devices?
A: Yes, you can configure multiple NTP time servers on the SRX
devices for increased reliability and redundancy. It is recommended
to configure at least three time servers for optimal time
synchronization.
Q: How can I troubleshoot NTP synchronization issues on the SRX
devices?
A: If you experience NTP synchronization issues on the SRX
devices, you can start by checking the NTP configuration, verifying
the connectivity to the time servers, and reviewing the system logs
for any error messages. You can also consult the Juniper Networks
support resources for further assistance.
Junos® OS
Common Criteria Guide for SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600 Devices
Published
2023-12-21
RELEASE
22.2R1
ii
Juniper Networks, Inc. 1133 Innovation Way Sunnyvale, California 94089 USA
408-745-2000 www.juniper.net
Juniper Networks, the Juniper Networks logo, Juniper, and Junos are registered
trademarks of Juniper Networks, Inc. in the United States and other countries.
All other trademarks, service marks, registered marks, or registered service
marks are the property of their respective owners.
Juniper Networks assumes no responsibility for any inaccuracies in this
document. Juniper Networks reserves the right to change, modify, transfer, or
otherwise revise this publication without notice.
Junos® OS Common Criteria Guide for SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600
Devices 22.2R1 Copyright © 2023 Juniper Networks, Inc. All rights reserved.
The information in this document is current as of the date on the title page.
YEAR 2000 NOTICE
Juniper Networks hardware and software products are Year 2000 compliant. Junos
OS has no known time-related limitations through the year 2038. However, the
NTP application is known to have some difficulty in the year 2036.
END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
The Juniper Networks product that is the subject of this technical
documentation consists of (or is intended for use with) Juniper Networks
software. Use of such software is subject to the terms and conditions of the
End User License Agreement (“EULA”) posted at
https://support.juniper.net/support/eula/. By downloading, installing or using
such software, you agree to the terms and conditions of that EULA.
iii
Table of Contents
About This Guide | viii
1
Overview
Understanding the Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration | 2
Understanding Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 3
Understanding FIPS Mode of Operation Terminology and Supported Cryptographic Algorithms | 5
Identifying Secure Product Delivery | 8
Applying Tamper-Evident Seals to the Cryptographic Module | 10
Understanding Management Interfaces | 12
2
Configuring Roles and Authentication Methods
Understanding Roles and Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 14
Understanding Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 16
Downloading Software Packages from Juniper Networks | 21
Installing Junos Software Packages | 21
Understanding Zeroization to Clear System Data for FIPS Mode of Operation | 22
Loading Firmware on the Device | 24
How to Enable and Configure Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 24
3
Configuring Administrative Credentials and Privileges
Understanding the Associated Password Rules for an Authorized Administrator | 29
Configuring a Network Device Protection Profile Authorized Administrator | 31
4
Network Time Protocol
NTP Overview | 34 Network Time Security (NTS) Support for NTP | 35
iv
NTP Time Servers | 38
Configure NTP Time Server and Time Services | 39 Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Client Mode | 40
Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Symmetric Active Mode | 41
Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Broadcast Mode | 41
Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Server Mode | 42
Example: Configure NTP as a Single Time Source for Router and Switch Clock Synchronization | 43
Synchronize and Coordinate Time Distribution Using NTP | 44 Configure NTP | 44
Configure NTP Boot Server | 45
Specify a Source Address for an NTP Server | 46
NTP Configuration | 48
Example: Configure NTP | 51 Requirements | 51
Overview | 52
Configuration | 52
Verification | 54
NTP Authentication Keys | 56
Configure Devices to Listen to Broadcast Messages Using NTP | 57
Configure Devices to Listen to Multicast Messages Using NTP | 57
5
Configuring SSH and Console Connection
Understanding FIPS Authentication Methods | 60
Configuring a System Login Message and Announcement | 61
Limiting the Number of User Login Attempts for SSH Sessions | 62
Configuring SSH on the Evaluated Configuration | 63
v
6
Configuring the Remote Syslog Server
Sample Syslog Server Configuration on a Linux System | 66
Configuring Event Logging to a Local File | 66
Configuring Event Logging to a Remote Server | 67
Configuring Event Logging to a Remote Server when Initiating the Connection from the Remote Server | 67
Forwarding Logs to the External Syslog Server | 73
7
Configuring Audit Log Options
Configuring Audit Log Options in the Evaluated Configuration | 75
Configuring Audit Log Options for SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600 Devices | 75
Sample Code Audits of Configuration Changes | 76
8
Configuring Event Logging
Event Logging Overview | 81
Interpreting Event Messages | 86
Logging Changes to Secret Data | 87
Login and Logout Events Using SSH | 89
Logging of Audit Startup | 89
9
Configuring a Secure Logging Channel
Creating a Secure Logging Channel | 92
10
Configuring VPNs
Configuring VPN on a Device Running Junos OS | 100
11
Configuring Security Flow Policies
Understanding a Security Flow Policy on a Device Running Junos OS | 124
12
Configuring Traffic Filtering Rules
Overview | 129
Understanding Protocol Support | 129
vi
Configuring Traffic Filter Rules | 131
Configuring Default Deny-All and Reject Rules | 132
Logging the Dropped Packets Using Default Deny-all Option | 133
Configuring Mandatory Reject Rules for Invalid Fragments and Fragmented IP Packets | 134
Configuring Default Reject Rules for Source Address Spoofing | 135
Configuring Default Reject Rules with IP Options | 136
Configuring Default Reject Rules | 137
13
Configuring Network Attacks
Configuring IP Teardrop Attack Screen | 139
Configuring TCP Land Attack Screen | 140
Configuring ICMP Fragment Screen | 142
Configuring Ping-Of-Death Attack Screen | 144
Configuring tcp-no-flag Attack Screen | 146
Configuring TCP SYN-FIN Attack Screen | 148
Configuring TCP fin-no-ack Attack Screen | 150
Configuring UDP Bomb Attack Screen | 152
Configuring UDP CHARGEN DoS Attack Screen | 152
Configuring TCP SYN and RST Attack Screen | 154
Configuring ICMP Flood Attack Screen | 157
Configuring TCP SYN Flood Attack Screen | 158
Configuring TCP Port Scan Attack Screen | 160
Configuring UDP Port Scan Attack Screen | 162
Configuring IP Sweep Attack Screen | 164
14
Configuring the IDP Extended Package
IDP Extended Package Configuration Overview | 167
vii
15
Configuring Cluster Mode
Understanding Cluster Mode | 169
Configuring L2 HA Link Encryption tunnel | 169
Configuring PKI Based L2HA Link Encryption | 174
16
Performing Self-Tests on a Device
Understanding FIPS Self-Tests | 185
17
Configuration Statements
checksum-validate | 196
code | 198
data-length | 199
destination-option | 201
extension-header | 203
header-type | 204
home-address | 206
identification | 208
icmpv6 (Security IDP Custom Attack) | 210
ihl (Security IDP Custom Attack) | 212
option-type | 213
reserved (Security IDP Custom Attack) | 215
routing-header | 217
sequence-number (Security IDP ICMPv6 Headers) | 218
type (Security IDP ICMPv6 Headers) | 220
viii
About This Guide
Use this guide to configure and evaluate SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and
SRX4600 devices for Common Criteria (CC) compliance. Common Criteria for
information technology is an international agreement signed by several
countries that permit the evaluation of security products against a common set
of standards.
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Common Criteria and FIPS Certifications
1 CHAPTER
Overview
Understanding the Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration | 2 Understanding
Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 3 Understanding FIPS Mode of Operation
Terminology and Supported Cryptographic Algorithms | 5 Identifying Secure
Product Delivery | 8 Applying Tamper-Evident Seals to the Cryptographic Module
| 10 Understanding Management Interfaces | 12
2
Understanding the Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration
IN THIS SECTION Understanding Common Criteria | 3 Supported Platforms | 3
This document describes the steps required to duplicate the configuration of
the device running Junos OS when the device is evaluated. This is referred to
as the evaluated configuration. The following list describes the standards to
which the device has been evaluated: · Collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices, NDcPPv2.2e–https://
www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/CPP_ND_V2.2E.pdf. PP modules for
NDcPP are as follows: · MOD_FW_CPP v1.4e https://www.niap-
ccevs.org/MMO/PP/MOD_CPP_FW_v1.4e.pdf · MOD_IPS_V1.0 https://www.niap-
ccevs.org/MMO/PP/MOD_IPS_v1.0.pdf · VPNGW_MOD v1.1 https://www.niap-
ccevs.org/MMO/PP/mod_vpngw_v1.1.pdf · Network Device Collaborative Protection
Profile (NDcPPv2.2)/Stateful Traffic Filter Firewall Collaborative Protection
Profile (FWcPP) Extended Package VPN Gateway, Version 2.2, 22 March 2020
(VPNEP) · Collaborative Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls, version 2.0, 14 March 2018
(FWcPP)https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/CPP_FW_V2.0E.pdf ·
Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices or Collaborative
Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls Extended Package (EP)
for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), (IPSEP) ·
FIPS–https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf These
documents are available at https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Profile/PP.cfm.
3
NOTE: On SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600 devices, Junos OS Release
22.2R1 is certified for Common Criteria with FIPS mode enabled on the devices.
Understanding Common Criteria
Common Criteria for information technology is an international agreement
signed by several countries that permits the evaluation of security products
against a common set of standards. In the Common Criteria Recognition
Arrangement (CCRA) at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/ccra/, the
participants agree to mutually recognize evaluations of products performed in
other countries. All evaluations are performed using a common methodology for
information technology security evaluation. For more information on Common
Criteria, see http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/.
Supported Platforms
For the features described in this document, the following platforms are
supported: · The IPSEP, NDcPP, FWcPP, and VPNEP apply to:
· SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Identifying Secure Product Delivery | 8
Understanding Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation
IN THIS SECTION About the Cryptographic Boundary on Your Device | 4
4
How FIPS Mode of Operation Differs from Non-FIPS Mode of Operation | 5
Validated Version of Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 5
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-3 defines security levels
for hardware and software that perform cryptographic functions. Junos-FIPS is
a version of the Junos operating system (Junos OS) that complies with Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-3. Operating SRX Series Firewalls
in a FIPS 140-3 Level 2 environment requires enabling and configuring FIPS
mode of operation on the device from the Junos OS command-line interface
(CLI). The Security Administrator enables FIPS mode of operation in Junos OS
Release 22.2R1 and sets up keys and passwords for the system and other FIPS
users who can view the configuration. Both user types can also perform normal
configuration tasks on the device (such as modify interface types) as
individual user configuration allows.
BEST PRACTICE: Be sure to verify the secure delivery of your device and apply
tamperevident seals to its vulnerable ports.
About the Cryptographic Boundary on Your Device
FIPS 140-3 compliance requires a defined cryptographic boundary around each
cryptographic module on a device. Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation prevents
the cryptographic module from running any software that is not part of the
FIPS-certified distribution, and allows only FIPS-approved cryptographic
algorithms to be used. No critical security parameters (CSPs), such as
passwords and keys, can cross the cryptographic boundary of the module by, for
example, being displayed on a console or written to an external log file.
CAUTION: Virtual Chassis features are not supported in FIPS mode of operation.
Do not configure a Virtual Chassis in FIPS mode of operation.
To physically secure the cryptographic module, all Juniper Networks devices
require a tamper-evident seal on the USB and mini-USB ports.
5
How FIPS Mode of Operation Differs from Non-FIPS Mode of Operation
Unlike Junos OS in non-FIPS mode of operation, Junos OS in FIPS mode of
operation is a nonmodifiable operational environment. In addition, Junos OS in
FIPS mode of operation differs in the following ways from Junos OS in non-FIPS
mode of operation: · Self-tests of all cryptographic algorithms are performed
at startup. · Self-tests of random number and key generation are performed
continuously. · Weak cryptographic algorithms such as Data Encryption Standard
(DES) and MD5 are disabled. · Weak, remote, or unencrypted management
connections must not be configured. · Passwords must be encrypted with strong
one-way algorithms that do not permit decryption. · Junos-FIPS administrator
passwords must be at least 10 characters long. · Cryptographic keys must be
encrypted before transmission. The FIPS 140-3 standard is available for
download from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-3/fips1402.pdf.
Validated Version of Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation
To determine the validated version of Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation and
for regulatory compliance information about Common Criteria and FIPS for
Juniper Networks products, see the Juniper Networks Compliance Advisor.
Understanding FIPS Mode of Operation Terminology and Supported Cryptographic
Algorithms
IN THIS SECTION FIPS Terminology | 6 Supported Cryptographic Algorithms | 7
6
Use the definitions of FIPS terms and supported algorithms to help you
understand Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation.
FIPS Terminology
Critical security parameter (CSP)
Security-related information–for example, secret and private cryptographic keys and authentication data such as passwords and personal identification numbers (PINs)– whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module or the information it protects.
Cryptographic module
The set of hardware, software, and firmware that implements approved security functions (including cryptographic algorithms and key generation) and is contained within the cryptographic boundary. SRX Series devices are certified at FIPS 140-3 Level 2.
Security Administrator
Person with appropriate permissions who is responsible for securely enabling, configuring, monitoring, and maintaining Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation on a device.
ESP
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol. The part of the IPsec protocol that
guarantees the confidentiality of packets through encryption. The protocol ensures
that if an ESP packet is successfully decrypted, and no other party knows the secret
key the peers share, the packet was not wiretapped in transit.
FIPS
Federal Information Processing Standards. FIPS 140-3 specifies requirements for
security and cryptographic modules. Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation complies
with FIPS 140-3 Level 2.
IKE
The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is part of IPsec and provides ways to securely
negotiate the shared private keys that the authentication header (AH) and ESP
portions of IPsec need to function properly. IKE employs Diffie-Hellman key-
exchange methods and is optional in IPsec. (The shared keys can be entered manually
at the endpoints.)
IPsec
The IP Security (IPsec) protocol. A standard way to add security to Internet communications. An IPsec security association (SA) establishes secure communication with another FIPS cryptographic module by means of mutual authentication and encryption.
KATs
Known answer tests. System self-tests that validate the output of cryptographic algorithms approved for FIPS and test the integrity of some Junos OS modules.
7
SA SPI SSH Zeroization
Security association (SA). A connection between hosts that allows them to
communicate securely by defining, for example, how they exchange private keys.
As Security Administrator, you must manually configure an internal SA on
devices running Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation. All values, including the
keys, must be statically specified in the configuration.
Security parameter index (SPI). A numeric identifier used with the destination
address and security protocol in IPsec to identify an SA. Because you manually
configure the SA for Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation, the SPI must be
entered as a parameter rather than derived randomly.
A protocol that uses strong authentication and encryption for remote access
across a nonsecure network. SSH provides remote login, remote program
execution, file copy, and other functions. It is intended as a secure
replacement for rlogin, rsh, and rcp in a UNIX environment. To secure the
information sent over administrative connections, use SSHv2 for CLI
configuration. In Junos OS, SSHv2 is enabled by default, and SSHv1, which is
not considered secure, is disabled.
Erasure of all CSPs and other user-created data on a device before its
operation as a FIPS cryptographic module–or in preparation for repurposing the
device for nonFIPS operation. The Security Administrator can zeroize the
system with a CLI operational command.
Supported Cryptographic Algorithms
Each implementation of an algorithm is checked by a series of known answer
test (KAT) self-tests. Any self-test failure results in a FIPS error state.
BEST PRACTICE: For FIPS 140-3 compliance, use only FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms in Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation.
The following cryptographic algorithms are supported in FIPS mode of operation. Symmetric methods use the same key for encryption and decryption, while asymmetric methods (preferred) use different keys for encryption and decryption.
AES
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), defined in FIPS PUB 197. The AES algorithm uses
keys of 128, 192, or 256 bits to encrypt and decrypt data in blocks of 128 bits.
8
DiffieHellman
A method of key exchange across a nonsecure environment (such as the Internet). The Diffie-Hellman algorithm negotiates a session key without sending the key itself across the network by allowing each party to pick a partial key independently and send part of that key to the other. Each side then calculates a common key value. This is a symmetrical method, and keys are typically used only for a short time, discarded, and regenerated.
ECDH
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman. A variant of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm that uses cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. ECDH allows two parties, each having an elliptic curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel. The shared secret can be used either as a key or to derive another key for encrypting subsequent communications using a symmetric key cipher.
ECDSA
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. A variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) that uses cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. The bit size of the elliptic curve determines the difficulty of decrypting the key. The public key believed to be needed for ECDSA is about twice the size of the security level, in bits. ECDSA using the P-256, P-384, or the P-521 curve can be configured under OpenSSH.
HMAC
Defined as “Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication” in RFC 2104, HMAC combines hashing algorithms with cryptographic keys for message authentication. For Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation, HMAC uses the iterated cryptographic hash function SHA-1 (designated as HMAC-SHA1) along with a secret key.
Identifying Secure Product Delivery
There are several mechanisms provided in the delivery process to ensure that a
customer receives a product that has not been tampered with. The customer
should perform the following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the
integrity of the platform.
· Shipping label–Ensure that the shipping label correctly identifies the
correct customer name and address as well as the device.
· Outside packaging–Inspect the outside shipping box and tape. Ensure that the
shipping tape has not been cut or otherwise compromised. Ensure that the box
has not been cut or damaged to allow access to the device.
· Inside packaging–Inspect the plastic bag and seal. Ensure that the bag is
not cut or removed. Ensure that the seal remains intact.
9
If the customer identifies a problem during the inspection, he or she should
immediately contact the supplier. Provide the order number, tracking number,
and a description of the identified problem to the supplier. Additionally,
there are several checks that can be performed to ensure that the customer has
received a box sent by Juniper Networks and not a different company
masquerading as Juniper Networks. The customer should perform the following
checks upon receipt of a device to verify the authenticity of the device: ·
Verify that the device was ordered using a purchase order. Juniper Networks
devices are never
shipped without a purchase order.
· When a device is shipped, a shipment notification is sent to the e-mail
address provided by the customer when the order is taken. Verify that this
e-mail notification was received. Verify that the email contains the following
information: · Purchase order number
· Juniper Networks order number used to track the shipment
· Carrier tracking number used to track the shipment
· List of items shipped including serial numbers
· Address and contacts of both the supplier and the customer
· Verify that the shipment was initiated by Juniper Networks. To verify that a
shipment was initiated by Juniper Networks, you should perform the following
tasks: · Compare the carrier tracking number of the Juniper Networks order
number listed in the Juniper Networks shipping notification with the tracking
number on the package received.
· Log on to the Juniper Networks online customer support portal at
https://support.juniper.net/ support/ to view the order status. Compare the
carrier tracking number or the Juniper Networks order number listed in the
Juniper Networks shipment notification with the tracking number on the package
received.
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Understanding the Common Criteria Evaluated
Configuration
10
Applying Tamper-Evident Seals to the Cryptographic Module
IN THIS SECTION General Tamper-Evident Seal Instructions | 11 Applying Tamper-
Evident Seals on the SRX1500 Device | 11 Applying Tamper-Evident Seals on the
SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600 Device | 12
The cryptographic modules physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip
standalone device that meets Level 2 physical security requirements. The
module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated,
cold rolled steel, plated steel, and brushed aluminum enclosure. There are no
ventilation holes, gaps, slits, cracks, slots, or crevices that would allow
for any sort of observation of any component contained within the
cryptographic boundary. Tamper-evident seals allow the operator to verify if
the enclosure has been breached. These seals are not factory-installed and
must be applied by the Cryptographic Officer.
NOTE: Seals are available for order from Juniper Networks using part number
JNPR-FIPSTAMPER-LBLS.
As a Cryptographic Officer, you are responsible for: · Applying seals to
secure the cryptographic module · Controlling any unused seals · Controlling
and observing any changes, such as repairs or booting from an external USB
drive to the
cryptographic module, that require removing or replacing the seals to maintain
the security of the module As per the security inspection guidelines, upon
receipt of the cryptographic module, the Cryptographic Officer must check that
the labels are free of any tamper evidence.
11
General Tamper-Evident Seal Instructions
All FIPS-certified switches require a tamper-evident seal on the USB ports.
While applying seals, follow these general instructions: · Handle the seals
with care. Do not touch the adhesive side. Do not cut or otherwise resize a
seal to
make it fit. · Make sure all surfaces to which the seals are applied are clean
and dry and clear of any residue. · Apply the seals with firm pressure across
the seal to ensure adhesion. Allow at least 1 hour for the
adhesive to cure.
Applying Tamper-Evident Seals on the SRX1500 Device
On SRX1500 devices, apply 10 tamper-evident seals at the following locations:
· Front pane:
· The front of the SRX1500 has two slot covers. The slot covers should be
secured with two screws each and then two tamper-evident labels must applied
to the slots. The tamper-evident labels go from the front of the SRX1500 to
the top.
· Apply two tamper labels to cover the USB port and two tamper labels to cover
the High Availability port.
· Rear pane: · The rear of the SRX1500 has two tamper-evident seals, the
tamper-evident seal at top of the rear-view wraps to the top of the device and
covers the fourth screw from the side containing the power supply. · Apply one
tamper label on the rear of the SRX1500, on the SSD slot cover, to the bottom
of the SRX1500. · Apply two tamper labels to cover the indicated screw on the
left and right side of the SRX1500 and wrap to the bottom of the SRX1500.
12
Applying Tamper-Evident Seals on the SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600 Device
NOTE: The placement of the tamper evident labels for the SRX4100, SRX4200, and
SRX4600 devices is exactly the same.
Apply 11 tamper-evident seals at the following locations: · Apply two tamper-
evident labels at the top of the chassis, covering one screw on the top-back
left
and one screw on the top-back right. The tamper evident labels cover the
screws on the top of the chassis and wrap down each side of the chassis. ·
Apply three tamper-evident labels at the bottom of the chassis, covering three
screws that secure the faceplates on the front of the chassis. The three
screws are entirely on the bottom of the chassis, they do not wrap around to
any other portion of the chassis. · Apply two tamper-evident labels covering
the two USB ports on the front of the SRX4100 and the SRX4200 devices. · Apply
two tamper-evident labels covering the two HA ports and two tamper-evident
labels covering the second HA port.
Understanding Management Interfaces
The following management interfaces can be used in the evaluated
configuration: · Local Management Interfaces–The RJ-45 console port on the
rear panel of a device is configured as
RS-232 data terminal equipment (DTE). You can use the command-line interface
(CLI) over this port to configure the device from a terminal. · Remote
Management Protocols–The device can be remotely managed over any Ethernet
interface. SSHv2 is the only permitted remote management protocol that can be
used in the evaluated configuration, and it is enabled by default on the
device. The remote management protocols J-Web and Telnet are not available for
use on the device in the evaluated configuration.
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Understanding the Common Criteria Evaluated
Configuration
2 CHAPTER
Configuring Roles and Authentication Methods
Understanding Roles and Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 14
Understanding Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 16 Downloading
Software Packages from Juniper Networks | 21 Installing Junos Software
Packages | 21 Understanding Zeroization to Clear System Data for FIPS Mode of
Operation |
22 Loading Firmware on the Device | 24 How to Enable and Configure Junos OS in
FIPS Mode of Operation | 24
14
Understanding Roles and Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation
IN THIS SECTION Security Administrator Role and Responsibilities | 14 FIPS
User Role and Responsibilities | 15 What Is Expected of All FIPS Users | 16
The Juniper Networks Junos operating system (Junos OS) running in non-FIPS
mode of operation allows a wide range of capabilities for users, and
authentication is identity-based. In contrast, the FIPS 140-3 standard defines
two user roles: Security Administrator and FIPS user. These roles are defined
in terms of Junos OS user capabilities. All other user types defined for Junos
OS in FIPS mode of operation (operator, administrative user, and so on) must
fall into one of the two categories: Security Administrator or FIPS user. For
this reason, user authentication in FIPS mode of operation is role-based
rather than identity-based. In addition to their FIPS roles, both user types
can perform normal configuration tasks on the device as individual user
configuration allows. Security Administrators and FIPS users perform all FIPS-
related configuration tasks and issue all statements and commands for Junos OS
in FIPS mode of operation. Security Administrator and FIPS user configurations
must follow the guidelines for Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation.
Security Administrator Role and Responsibilities
The Security Administrator is the person responsible for enabling,
configuring, monitoring, and maintaining Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation on
a device. The Security Administrator securely installs Junos OS on the device,
enables FIPS mode of operation, establishes keys and passwords for other users
and software modules, and initializes the device before network connection.
The Security Administrator can configure and monitor the module through a
console or SSH connection.
15
BEST PRACTICE: We recommend that the Security Administrator administer the
system in a secure manner by keeping passwords secure and checking audit
files.
The permissions that distinguish the Security Administrator from other FIPS
users are secret, security, maintenance, and control. For FIPS compliance,
assign the Security Administrator to a login class that contains all of these
permissions. A user with the Junos OS maintenance permission can read files
containing critical security parameters (CSPs).
NOTE: Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation does not support the FIPS 140-3
maintenance role, which is different from the Junos OS maintenance permission.
Among the tasks related to Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation, the Security
Administrator is expected to: · Set the initial root password. · Reset user
passwords for FIPS-approved algorithms during upgrades from Junos OS. · Set up
manual IPsec SAs for configuration with dual Routing Engines. · Examine log
and audit files for events of interest. · Erase user-generated files and data
on (zeroize) the device.
FIPS User Role and Responsibilities
All FIPS users, including the Security Administrator, can view the
configuration. Only the user assigned as the Security Administrator can modify
the configuration. The permissions that distinguish Security Administrators
from other FIPS users are secret, security, maintenance, and control. For FIPS
compliance, assign the FIPS user to a class that contains none of these
permissions. FIPS users configure networking features on the device and
perform other tasks that are not specific to FIPS mode of operation. FIPS
users who are not Security Administrators can perform reboots and view status
output.
16
What Is Expected of All FIPS Users
All FIPS users, including the Security Administrator, must observe security
guidelines at all times. All FIPS users must: · Keep all passwords
confidential. · Store devices and documentation in a secure area. · Deploy
devices in secure areas. · Check audit files periodically. · Conform to all
other FIPS 140-3 security rules. · Follow these guidelines:
· Users are trusted. · Users abide by all security guidelines. · Users do not
deliberately compromise security. · Users behave responsibly at all times.
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Understanding FIPS Mode of Operation Terminology and
Supported Cryptographic Algorithms | 5 Understanding Zeroization to Clear
System Data for FIPS Mode of Operation
Understanding Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation
IN THIS SECTION Understanding Authenticated Services | 17 Critical Security
Parameters | 18
17 All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables that follow.
Understanding Authenticated Services
Table 1 on page 17 lists the authenticated services on the device running Junos OS. Table 1: Authenticated services
Authenticated Services
Description
Security Administrator
User (read-only)
User (network)
Configure security Security relevant
x
configuration
Configure
Non-security
x
relevant
configuration
Secure traffic
IPsec protected
x
routing
Status
Display the status x
x
Zeroize
Destroy all critical x
security parameters
(CSPs)
SSH connect
Initiate SSH
x
x
connection for SSH
monitoring and
control (CLI)
IPsec connect
Initiate IPsec
x
x
connection (IKE)
Console access
Console monitoring x
x
and control (CLI)
18
Table 1: Authenticated services (Continued)
Authenticated Services
Description
Security Administrator
User (read-only)
User (network)
Remote reset
Software-initiated x
reset
Table 2: Unauthenticated traffic
Service
Description
Local reset
Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic
Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
Critical Security Parameters
Critical security parameters (CSPs) are security-related information such as
cryptographic keys and passwords that can compromise the security of the
cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the
module if they are disclosed or modified.
Zeroization of the system erases all traces of CSPs in preparation for
operating the device as a cryptographic module.
Table 3 on page 18 lists the CSP access rights within services.
Table 3: CSP Access Rights Within Services
Service
CSPs
DRBG_Se DRBG_Stat SSH PHK
ed
e
SSH DH
SSH-SEK ESP-SEK
Configure security
E
G, W
19
Table 3: CSP Access Rights Within Services (Continued)
Service
CSPs
DRBG_Se DRBG_Stat SSH PHK
ed
e
SSH DH
SSH-SEK ESP-SEK
Configure
Secure Traffic
E
Status
Zeroize
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
SSH connect
E
E
G, E
G, E
IPSec connect
E
G
Console access
Remote reset
G, E
G
Z
Z
Z
Local Reset
G, E
G
Z
Z
Z
Traffic
Service
Configure security Configure
CSPs IKE-PSK W
IKE-Priv G, W
IKE-SKEYI
IKE-SKE
IKE-DH-PRI
20
(Continued)
Service
Secure Traffic Status Zeroize SSH connect IPSec connect Console access Remote
reset Local Reset Traffic
CSPs IKE-PSK Z E
IKE-Priv Z E
IKE-SKEYI
IKE-SKE
IKE-DH-PRI
E
G
G
G
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Here: · G = Generate: The device generates the CSP. · E = Execute: The device runs using the CSP. · W = Write: The CSP is updated or written to the device. · Z = Zeroize: The device zeroizes the CSP.
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Understanding Zeroization to Clear System Data for FIPS Mode of Operation Understanding FIPS Authentication Methods | 60
21
Downloading Software Packages from Juniper Networks
To operate in Junos OS in FIPS mode, the device must have the following
software package installed. You can download the following Junos OS software
packages from the Juniper Networks website: · Junos OS for SRX1500, SRX4100,
SRX4200, and SRX4600 devices Release 22.2R1. Before you begin to download the
software, ensure that you have a Juniper Networks Web account and a valid
support contract. To obtain an account, complete the registration form at the
Juniper Networks website:
https://userregistration.juniper.net/entitlement/setupAccountInfo.do. To
download software packages from Juniper Networks: 1. Using a Web browser,
follow the links to the download URL on the Juniper Networks webpage.
https://support.juniper.net/support/downloads/ 2. Log in to the Juniper
Networks authentication system using the username (generally your e-mail
address) and password supplied by Juniper Networks representatives. 3.
Download the software. See Downloading Software
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Installation and Upgrade Guide
Installing Junos Software Packages
SRX Series devices can provide the security defined by Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-3 Level 2 if these devices are operated in the
Junos OS in FIPS mode.
NOTE: Junos OS is delivered in signed packages that contain digital signatures
to ensure the Juniper Networks software is running. When installing the
software packages, Junos OS validates the signatures and the public key
certificates used to digitally sign the software packages. If the signature or
certificate is found to be invalid (for example, when the certificate validity
period has
22
expired or cannot be verified against the root CA stored in the Junos OS
internal store), the installation process fails.
To install these software packages, perform the following tasks: 1. Download
the Junos OS package and the Junos FIPS mode package from
https://support.juniper.net/
support/downloads/. See Downloading Software. 2. Install the Junos OS on your
device using a TFTP server, see Installing Junos OS on SRX Series
Devices from the Boot Loader Using a TFTP Server or install Junos OS on your
device using the following CLI command: request system software add /<image-
path>/
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Installation and Upgrade Guide
Understanding Zeroization to Clear System Data for FIPS Mode of Operation
IN THIS SECTION Why Zeroize? | 23 When to Zeroize? | 23
Zeroization completely erases all configuration information on the device,
including all plaintext passwords, secrets, and private keys for SSH, local
encryption, local authentication, and IPsec. To exit the FIPS mode you need to
zeroize the device. The cryptographic module provides a non-approved mode of
operation in which non-approved cryptographic algorithms are supported. When
moving from the non-approved mode of operation to the approved mode of
operation, the Security Administrator must zeroize the non-approved mode
critical security parameters (CSPs). For SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and
SRX4600 devices, the Security Administrator initiates the zeroization process
by entering the request vmhost zeroize hypervisor command
23
from the CLI after enabling FIPS mode of operation. Use of this command is
restricted to the Security Administrator.
CAUTION: Perform system zeroization with care. After the zeroization process
is complete, no data is left on the device. This command erases all the CSPs,
configurations, and the hard disk partitions containing the device image.
Hence, the device does not boot up on zeroization and USB reimage is required
to recover the device.
Zeroization can be time-consuming. Although all configurations are removed in
a few seconds, the zeroization process goes on to overwrite all media, which
can take considerable time depending on the size of the media.
Why Zeroize?
Your device is not considered a valid FIPS cryptographic module until all CSPs
have been entered–or reentered–while the device is in FIPS mode of operation.
For FIPS 140-3 compliance, the only way to exit from FIPS mode is to zeroize
the TOE.
When to Zeroize?
As a Security Administrator, perform zeroization in the following situations:
· Before FIPS operation–To prepare your device for operation as a FIPS
cryptographic module,
perform zeroization to remove the non-approved mode critical security
parameters (CSPs) and enable FIPS mode on the device. · Before non-FIPS
operation–To begin repurposing your device for non-FIPS operation, perform
zeroization on the device.
NOTE: Juniper Networks does not support installing non-FIPS software in a FIPS
mode of operation, but doing so might be necessary in certain test
environments. Be sure to zeroize the system first.
· When a tamper-evident seal is disturbed–If the seal on an insecure port has
been tampered with, the system is considered to be compromised. After applying
new tamper-evident seals to the appropriate locations, zeroize the system and
set up new passwords and CSPs.
24
Loading Firmware on the Device
The Junos OS 22.2R1 FIPS images only accept the firmware signed with ECDSA and
rejects any firmware signed with RSA+SHA1. You cannot downgrade to images that
are signed with RSA+SHA1 from “ECDSA signed only” images. In this scenario,
the SRX Series Firewall does not load the firmware.
How to Enable and Configure Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation
You, as Security Administrator, can enable and configure Junos OS in FIPS mode
of operation on your device. Before you begin enabling and configuring FIPS
mode of operation on the device: · Verify the secure delivery of your device.
See “Identifying Secure Product Delivery” on page 8. · Apply tamper-evident
seals. See “Applying Tamper-Evident Seals to the Cryptographic Module” on
page 10. To enable the Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation, perform the
following steps: 1. Zeroize the device before enabling FIPS mode of operation
user@host> request system zeroize hypervisor 2. Enable the FIPS mode on the
device.
user@host# set system fips level 2 3. Set the root password.
user@host# set system root-authentication plain-text-password. Enter a
password. 4. Remove the CSPs on commit check. user@host# commit 5. After you
reboot the device, perform integrity and self-test when the module is
operating in FIPS mode.
25
6. Configure IKEv2 when AES-GCM is used for encryption of IKE and/or IPSec.
user@host# set security ike proposal
Possible completions:
aes-128-cbc AES-CBC 128-bit encryption algorithm
aes-128-gcm AES-GCM 128-bit encryption algorithm
aes-192-cbc AES-CBC 192-bit encryption algorithm
aes-256-cbc AES-CBC 256-bit encryption algorithm
aes-256-gcm AES-GCM 256-bit encryption algorithm
user@host# set security ike proposal
user@host# set security ipsec proposal
user@host# set security ike gateway
Possible completions:
v1-only
The connection must be initiated using IKE version 1
v2-only
The connection must be initiated using IKE version 2
user@host# set security ike gateway
user@host# commit
commit complete
Ensure that the backup image of the firmware is also a JUNOS-FIPS image by issuing the request system snapshot command.
user@host-srx4200:fips> show version Hostname: host-srx4200 Model: srx4200 Junos: 22.2R1.9 JUNOS OS Kernel 64-bit [20220607.2c547a1_builder_stable_12_222] JUNOS OS libs [20220607.2c547a1_builder_stable_12_222] JUNOS OS runtime [20220607.2c547a1_builder_stable_12_222] JUNOS OS time zone information [20220607.2c547a1_builder_stable_12_222] JUNOS network stack and utilities [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS libs [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS OS libs compat32 [20220607.2c547a1_builder_stable_12_222] JUNOS OS 32-bit compatibility [20220607.2c547a1_builder_stable_12_222] JUNOS libs compat32 [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS runtime [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] Junos vmguest package [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS py extensions [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS py base [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS OS vmguest [20220607.2c547a1_builder_stable_12_222] JUNOS OS crypto [20220607.2c547a1_builder_stable_12_222]
26
JUNOS OS boot-ve files [20220607.2c547a1_builder_stable_12_222] JUNOS na
telemetry [22.2R1.9] JUNOS Web Management Platform Package
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS srx libs compat32
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS srx runtime
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Routing mpls-oam-basic
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Routing lsys
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Routing 32-bit Compatible Version
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Routing aggregated
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] Redis
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS probe utility
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS common platform support
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS srx platform support
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Openconfig [22.2R1.9] JUNOS mtx
network modules [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS modules
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS srx modules
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS srx libs
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS L2 RSI Scripts
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS srx Data Plane Crypto Support
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS ike
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS daemons
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS srx daemons
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS High End AppQos Daemon
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services URL Filter package
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services TLB Service PIC package
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services Telemetry
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services TCP-LOG
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services SSL
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services SOFTWIRE
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services Stateful Firewall
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services RTCOM
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services RPM
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services PCEF package
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services NAT
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services Mobile Subscriber
Service Container package [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS
Services MobileNext Software package [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1]
JUNOS Services Logging Report Framework package
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services LL-PDF Container package
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services Jflow Container package
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services Deep Packet Inspection
package [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services IPSec
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1]
27
JUNOS Services IDS [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS IDP Services
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services HTTP Content Management
package [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services DNS Filter
package (i386) [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services Crypto
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services Captive Portal and
Content Delivery Container package [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1]
JUNOS Services COS [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS AppId Services
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services Application Level
Gateways [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Services AACL Container
package [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Extension Toolkit
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Packet Forwarding Engine Support
(wrlinuxlts19) [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Packet Forwarding
Engine Support (spc3) [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Packet
Forwarding Engine Support (MX/EX92XX Common)
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Packet Forwarding Engine Support
(M/T Common) [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Packet Forwarding
Engine Support (MX Common) [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS
Juniper Malware Removal Tool (JMRT)
[1.0.0+20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS J-Insight
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS jfirmware
[20220608.110139_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS Online Documentation
[20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS jail runtime
[20220607.2c547a1_builder_stable_12_222] JUNOS fips optest [22.2R1.9] JUNOS
FIPS mode utilities [20220617.153850_builder_junos_222_r1] JUNOS dsa dsa
[22.2R1.9] The fips keyword next to the hostname in the output indicates that
the module is operating in FIPS mode for Junos Software Release 22.2R1for
SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600.
RELATED DOCUMENTATION
Loading Firmware on the Device | 24
3 CHAPTER
Configuring Administrative Credentials and Privileges
Understanding the Associated Password Rules for an Authorized Administrator |
29
Configuring a Network Device Protection Profile Authorized Administrator | 31
29
Understanding the Associated Password Rules for an Authorized Administrator
The authorized administrator is associated with a defined login class, and the
administrator is assigned with all permissions. Data is stored locally for
fixed password authentication.
NOTE: We recommend that you not use control characters in passwords.
Use the following guidelines and configuration options for passwords and when
selecting passwords for authorized administrator accounts. Passwords should
be: · Easy to remember so that users are not tempted to write it down. ·
Changed periodically. · Private and not shared with anyone. · Contain a
minimum of 10 characters. The minimum password length is 10 characters.
[ edit ] administrator@host# set system login password minimum-length 10
· Include both alphanumeric and punctuation characters, composed of any
combination of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters
such as, “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”. There should be
at least a change in one case, one or more digits, and one or more punctuation
marks.
· Contain character sets. Valid character sets include uppercase letters,
lowercase letters, numbers, punctuation, and other special characters.
[ edit ] administrator@host# set system login password change-type character-
sets
30
· Contain the minimum number of character sets or character set changes. The
minimum number of character sets required in plain-text passwords in Junos
FIPS is 2.
[ edit ] administrator@host# set system login password minimum-changes 2
NOTE: The authentication algorithm for plain-text passwords must be configured
as sha256. [ edit ] administrator@host# set system login password format
sha256
Weak passwords are: · Words that might be found in or exist as a permuted form
in a system file such as /etc/passwd. · The hostname of the system (always a
first guess). · Any words appearing in a dictionary. This includes
dictionaries other than English, and words found
in works such as Shakespeare, Lewis Carroll, Roget’s Thesaurus, and so on.
This prohibition includes common words and phrases from sports, sayings,
movies, and television shows. · Permutations on any of the above. For example,
a dictionary word with vowels replaced with digits (for example f00t) or with
digits added to the end. · Any machine-generated passwords. Algorithms reduce
the search space of password-guessing programs and so should not be used.
Strong reusable passwords can be based on letters from a favorite phrase or
word, and then concatenated with other, unrelated words, along with additional
digits and punctuation. If the limit on the consecutive invalid password is
reached, the user account is locked. The account automatically unlocks after
the configured lockout time expires, or the account can be manually unlocked
using the following command:
[ edit ] administrator@host# clear system login lockout user username
NOTE: Passwords should be changed periodically.
31
Configuring a Network Device Protection Profile Authorized Administrator
An account for root is always present in a configuration and is not intended
for use in normal operation. In the evaluated configuration, the root account
is restricted to the initial installation and configuration of the evaluated
device. An NDPP authorized administrator must have all permissions, including
the ability to change the router configuration. To configure an authorized
administrator: 1. Create a login class named security-admin with all
permissions.
[edit] root@host# set system login class security-admin permissions all 2.
Define your NDPP user authorized administrator.
[edit] root@host# set system login user NDcPPv2-user class security-admin
authentication encryptedpassword
OR
root@host# set system login user NDcPPv2-user class security-admin
authentication plain-textpassword 3. Configure the authentication algorithm
for plain-text passwords as sha256.
[edit] root@host# set system login password format sha256 4. Commit the
changes.
[edit] root@host# commit
32
NOTE: The root password should be reset following the change to sha256 for the
password storage format. This ensures the new password is protected using a
sha256 hash, rather than the default password hashing algorithm. To reset the
root password, use the set system login user root password password command,
and confirm the new password when prompted.
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Understanding the Associated Password Rules for an
Authorized Administrator | 29
4 CHAPTER
Network Time Protocol
NTP Overview | 34 NTP Time Servers | 38 Configure NTP Time Server and Time
Services | 39 Example: Configure NTP as a Single Time Source for Router and
Switch Clock Synchronization | 43 Synchronize and Coordinate Time Distribution
Using NTP | 44 NTP Configuration | 48 Example: Configure NTP | 51 NTP
Authentication Keys | 56 Configure Devices to Listen to Broadcast Messages
Using NTP | 57 Configure Devices to Listen to Multicast Messages Using NTP |
57
34
NTP Overview
IN THIS SECTION Network Time Security (NTS) Support for NTP | 35
Network Time Protocol (NTP) is a widely used protocol used to synchronize the
clocks of routers and other hardware devices on the Internet. Primary NTP
servers are synchronized to a reference clock directly traceable to
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). Reference clocks include GPS receivers and
telephone modem services, NTP accuracy expectations depend on the environment
application requirements. However, NTP can generally maintain time to within
tens of milliseconds over the public internet. NTP is defined in the RFC 5905:
Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification Devices
running Junos OS can be configured to act as an NTP client, a secondary NTP
server, or a primary NTP server. These variations are as follows: · Primary
NTP Server–Primary NTP servers are synchronized to a reference clock that is
directly
traceable to UTC. These servers then re-distribute this time data downstream
to other Secondary NTP servers or NTP clients. · Secondary NTP
Server–Secondary NTP servers are synchronized to a primary or secondary NTP
server. These servers then re-distribute this data downstream to other
Secondary NTP servers or NTP clients. · NTP Client–NTP clients are
synchronized to a primary or secondary NTP server. Clients do not redistribute
this time data to other devices.
NOTE: The NTP subnet includes a number of widely accessible public primary
time servers that can be used as a network’s primary NTP server. Juniper
Networks strongly recommends that you authenticate any primary servers you
use.
Each device on your network can be configured to run in one or more of the
following NTP modes: · Broadcast Mode–One or more devices is set up to
transmit time information to a specified broadcast
or multicast address. Other devices listen for time sync packets on these
addresses. This mode is less accurate than the client/server mode.
35
· Client/Server Mode–Devices are organized hierarchically across the network
in client/server relationships.
· Symmetric Active (peer) Mode–Two or more devices are configured as NTP
server peers to provide redundancy.
By default, if an NTP client time drifts so that the difference in time from
the NTP server exceeds 128 milliseconds, the NTP client is automatically
stepped back into synchronization. The NTP client will still synchronize with
the server even if the offset between the NTP client and server exceeds the
1000second threshold. You can manually request that a device synchronize with
an NTP server by using the set date ntp operational command on the router. On
devices running Junos OS that have dual Routing Engines, the backup Routing
Engine synchronizes directly with the primary Routing Engine. All Juniper
platforms that run Junos OS support the leap second adjustment. By default, if
the NTP server is aware of the leap second calculations, then the Junos device
will automatically add the 1 second delay. PTP (Precision Time Protocol) is
used to detect and propagate leap second synchronization changes throughout
all nodes in a network. NTP is also required for Common Criteria compliance.
For more information on the Common Criteria certification, see Public Sector
Certifications. For more details about the Network Time Protocol, go to the
Network Time Foundation website at http://www.ntp.org. NTP supports IPv4 VPN
and IPv6 routing and forwarding (VRF) requests on Junos OS. VRF request is
also supported on Junos OS Evolved Release 20.2R1 onwards. This enables an NTP
server running on a provider edge (PE) router to respond to NTP requests from
a customer edge (CE) router. As a result, a PE router can process any NTP
request packet coming from different routing instances.
Network Time Security (NTS) Support for NTP
IN THIS SECTION NTS Overview | 36 Benefits of NTS | 36 Network Time
Synchronization with NTS | 36
36
NTS Overview
NTS provides cryptographic security for network time synchronization and
supports client-server mode of NTP. NTS uses Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol and Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) to obtain
network time in an authenticated manner to the users. NTS also provides
support for encryption of NTP extension fields. The most important security
processes are dependent on accurate time. Network time synchronization from a
malicious source leads to serious consequences. Enabling NTS ensures accurate
network time synchronization on your device.
Benefits of NTS
· Provides strong cryptographic protection against wide range of security
attacks such as packet manipulation, spoofing, DDOS amplification attacks, and
replay attacks
· Ensures accurate network time synchronization from a reliable source ·
Provides scalability: Servers can serve several clients without manually pre-
configuring any client-
specific configuration. Because of the usage of cookies the server does not
need to locally store the client specific data such as keys and AEAD algorithm
· Prevents tracking of mobile devices
Network Time Synchronization with NTS
NTS consists of two protocols, the NTS Key Establishment protocol (NTS-KE) and
the NTP time synchronization using NTS extension fields.
NTS-KE Protocol
In the NTS-KE protocol phase, the NTS-KE protocol manages the initial
authentication, NTS parameter negotiation, and key establishment over TLS in
the following order: 1. The client performs a TLS handshake with the NTS-KE
server and successfully verify the certificates. 2. The client performs the
NTS parameters negotiation with the server over the TLS-protected channel.
The cryptographic algorithms negotiated are AEAD methods, which protects the
NTP packets in the second phase. 3. The client and the server successfully
establish the key material for communication. 4. The server also sends a
supply of initial cookies to the client to use in next phase.
37
5. The TLS channel closes and NTP proceeds to the next phase where actual
exchange of time data happens.
NTS supports only the TLS version 1.3. The older TLS versions get rejected
during the NTS-KE protocol phase.
NTP Time Synchronization Using NTS Extension Fields
This phase manages the encryption and authentication during NTP time
synchronization through the extension fields in the NTP packets in the
following order:
1. The client queries the NTP server about time with NTS extension fields.
These extension fields include cookies and an authentication tag computed
using negotiated AEAD algorithm and key material extracted from the NTS-KE
handshake.
An NTS-secured NTP client request contains the following NTS extension fields:
· Unique Identifier Extension Field: Contains randomly generated data and
provides the means for replay protection at the NTS level.
· NTS Cookie Extension Field: Contains the information about the key material,
which establishes during NTS-KE phase, and the negotiated cryptographic
algorithm. A cookie is only used once in a request to prevent tracking.
· NTS Cookie Placeholder Extension Field: (Optional) Communicates to the
server that the client wants to receive additional cookies in the response
packet.
· NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extension Fields: Generated using AEAD
Algorithm and key established during NTS-KE. This field provides the integrity
protection for the NTP header and all the previous extension fields.
Constant refreshing of cookies protects a device from tracking when it changes
network addresses. For example a mobile device moving across different
networks. The lack of any recognizable data prevents an adversary from
determining that two packets sent over different network addresses came from
the same client.
2. When the server receives an NTS-secured request from the client, the
server decrypts the cookie with a master key.
3. The server extracts the negotiated AEAD algorithm and the keys that are
available in the cookie. Using this key, the server checks the integrity of
the NTP packet to ensure no manipulations to the packet.
4. The server generates one or more new cookies and creates the NTP response
packet. The server generates at least one new cookie and one additional cookie
for each Cookie Placeholder Extension Field that the client added in the
request packet.
38
The response packet contains two NTS extension fields: · The Unique Identifier
Extension Field, which has the same contents from the Unique Identifier
field in request packet.
· The NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extension Field, which secures the NTP
header and the previous extension fields using the extracted keys.
5. The server also encrypts the cookies and includes them in the NTS
Authenticator and Encrypted Extension Fields. This procedure also protects the
client from tracking because an attacker cannot extract the cookies from a
response message.
6. The server finalizes the response packet and sends the packet to the
client.
7. The client receives the response packet.
8. The client checks the Unique Identifier field and verifies that the Unique
Identifier matches with an outstanding request.
9. The client successfully performs the integrity check of the packet using
the key and the AEAD algorithm.
10. The client decrypts the cookies and adds them to its pool and processes
the time information received from server.
NTP Time Servers
The IETF defined the Network Time Protocol (NTP) to synchronize the clocks of
computer systems connected to each other over a network. Most large networks
have an NTP server that ensures that time on all devices is synchronized,
regardless of the device location. If you use one or more NTP servers on your
network, ensure you include the NTS server addresses in your Junos OS
configuration. When configuring the NTP, you can specify which system on the
network is the authoritative time source, or time server, and how time is
synchronized between systems on the network. To do this, you configure the
router, switch, or security device to operate in one of the following modes: ·
Client mode–In this mode, the local router or switch can be synchronized with
the remote system,
but the remote system can never be synchronized with the local router or
switch.
· Symmetric active mode–In this mode, the local router or switch and the
remote system can synchronize with each other. You use this mode in a network
in which either the local router or switch or the remote system might be a
better source of time.
39
Symmetric active mode can be initiated by either the local or the remote
system. Only one system needs to be configured to do so. This means that the
local system can synchronize with any system that offers symmetric active mode
without any configuration whatsoever. However, we strongly encourage you to
configure authentication to ensure that the local system synchronizes only
with known time servers. · Broadcast mode–In this mode, the local router or
switch sends periodic broadcast messages to a client population at the
specified broadcast or multicast address. Normally, you include this statement
only when the local router or switch is operating as a transmitter. · Server
mode–In this mode, the local router or switch operates as an NTP server. In
NTP server mode, the Junos OS supports authentication as follows: · If the NTP
request from the client comes with an authentication key (such as a key ID and
message digest sent with the packet), the request is processed and answered
based on the authentication key match. · If the NTP request from the client
comes without any authentication key, the request is processed and answered
without authentication.
Configure NTP Time Server and Time Services
IN THIS SECTION Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Client Mode | 40
Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Symmetric Active Mode | 41
Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Broadcast Mode | 41 Configure the
Router or Switch to Operate in Server Mode | 42
When you use NTP, configure the router or switch to operate in one of the
following modes: · Client mode · Symmetric active mode · Broadcast mode ·
Server mode
40
The following topics describe how to configure these modes of operation:
Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Client Mode
To configure the local router or switch to operate in client mode, include the
server statement and other optional statements at the [edit system ntp]
hierarchy level:
[edit system ntp] server address
Specify the address of the system acting as the time server. You must specify
an address, not a hostname. To include an authentication key in all messages
sent to the time server, include the key option. The key corresponds to the
key number you specify in the authentication-key statement, as described in .
By default, the router or switch sends NTP version 4 packets to the time
server. To set the NTP version level to 1, 2, or 3, include the version
option. If you configure more than one time server, you can mark one server
preferred by including the prefer option. The following example shows how to
configure the router or switch to operate in client mode:
[edit system ntp] authentication-key 1 type md5 value “$ABC123″; server
10.1.1.1 key 1 prefer; trusted-key 1;
41
Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Symmetric Active Mode
To configure the local router or switch to operate in symmetric active mode,
include the peer statement at the [edit system ntp] hierarchy level:
[edit system ntp] peer address
Specify the address of the remote system. You must specify an address, not a
hostname. To include an authentication key in all messages sent to the remote
system, include the key option. The key corresponds to the key number you
specify in the authentication-key statement. By default, the router or switch
sends NTP version 4 packets to the remote system. To set the NTP version level
to 1, 2 or 3, include the version option. If you configure more than one
remote system, you can mark one system preferred by including the prefer
option:
peer address
Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Broadcast Mode
To configure the local router or switch to operate in broadcast mode, include
the broadcast statement at the [edit system ntp] hierarchy level:
[edit system ntp] broadcast address
Specify the broadcast address on one of the local networks or a multicast
address assigned to NTP. You must specify an address, not a hostname. If the
multicast address is used, it must be 224.0.1.1. To include an authentication
key in all messages sent to the remote system, include the key option. The key
corresponds to the key number you specify in the authentication-key statement.
By default, the router or switch sends NTP version 4 packets to the remote
system. To set the NTP version level to 1, 2, or 3, include the version
option.
42
Configure the Router or Switch to Operate in Server Mode
In server mode, the router or switch acts as an NTP server for clients when
the clients are configured appropriately. The only prerequisite for ” server
mode” is that the router or switch must be receiving time from another NTP
peer or server. No other configuration is necessary on the router or switch.
When configuring the NTP service in the management VRF (mgmt_junos), you must
configure at least one IP address on a physical or logical interface within
the default routing instance and ensure that this interface is up in order for
the NTP service to work with the mgmt_junos VRF.
To configure the local router or switch to operate as an NTP server, include
the following statements at the [edit system ntp] hierarchy level:
[edit system ntp] authentication-key key-number type type value password;
server address
Specify the address of the system acting as the time server. You must specify
an address, not a hostname.
To include an authentication key in all messages sent to the time server,
include the key option. The key corresponds to the key number you specify in
the authentication-key statement.
By default, the router or switch sends NTP version 4 packets to the time
server. To set the NTP version level to 1,or 2, or 3, include the version
option.
If you configure more than one time server, you can mark one server preferred
by including the prefer option.
The following example shows how to configure the router or switch to operate
in server mode:
[edit system ntp] authentication-key 1 type md5 value “$ABC123”; server
192.168.27.46 prefer; trusted-key 1;
43
Example: Configure NTP as a Single Time Source for
Router and Switch Clock Synchronization
Debugging and troubleshooting are much easier when the timestamps in the log
files of all the routers or switches are synchronized, because events that
span the network can be correlated with synchronous entries in multiple logs.
We strongly recommend using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) to synchronize the
system clocks of routers, switches, and other network equipment.
By default, NTP operates in an entirely unauthenticated manner. If a malicious
attempt to influence the accuracy of a router or switch’s clock succeeds, it
could have negative effects on system logging, make troubleshooting and
intrusion detection more difficult, and impede other management functions.
The following sample configuration synchronizes all the routers or switches in
the network to a single time source. We recommend using authentication to make
sure that the NTP peer is trusted. The bootserver statement identifies the
server from which the initial time of day and date is obtained when the router
boots. The server statement identifies the NTP server used for periodic time
synchronization. The authentication-key statement specifies that an HMAC-
Message Digest 5 (MD5) scheme should be used to hash the key value for
authentication, which prevents the router or switch from synchronizing with an
attacker’s host posing as the time server.
[edit] system {
ntp { authentication-key 2 type md5 value “$ABC123”; # SECRET-DATA boot-server
10.1.4.1; server 10.1.4.2 key 2; trusted key 2;
} }
44
Synchronize and Coordinate Time Distribution Using NTP
IN THIS SECTION Configure NTP | 44 Configure NTP Boot Server | 45 Specify a
Source Address for an NTP Server | 46
Using NTP to synchronize and coordinate time distribution in a large network
involves these tasks:
Configure NTP
· To configure NTP on the switch, include the ntp statement at the [edit
system] hierarchy level:
[edit system] ntp {
authentication-key number type type value password; boot-server (address |
hostname); broadcast
45
· Use the system login user command.
user@host# set system login user lab-test authentication plain-text-password
New password: Retype new password:
· Login with user-id “lab-test”.
user@host# set system login user lab-test class super-user · View process ID
for NTP using the show system processes command.
user@host# show system processes | match ntp
· Terminate and restart the NTP process using the request system process
terminate command.
user@host# request system process terminate
Configure NTP Boot Server
When you boot the switch, it issues an ntpdate request, which polls a network
server to determine the local date and time. You need to configure a server
that the switch uses to determine the time when the switch boots. Otherwise,
NTP will not be able to synchronize to a time server if the server’s time
appears to be very far off of the local switch’s time. · To configure the NTP
boot server, include the boot-server statement at the [edit system ntp]
hierarchy
level:
[edit system ntp] boot-server (address | hostname);
46
NOTE: The boot-server option is deprecated starting in Junos OS Release
20.4R1.
· Junos OS Release 15.1 onwards, to configure the NTP boot server, include the
set ntp server statement at the [edit system ntp] hierarchy level:
[edit system ntp] set server (address | hostname);
Specify either the IP address or the hostname of the network server.
Specify a Source Address for an NTP Server
For IP version 4 (IPv4), you can specify that if the NTP server configured at
the [edit system ntp] hierarchy level is contacted on one of the loopback
interface addresses, the reply always uses a specific source address. This is
useful for controlling which source address NTP will use to access your
network when it is either responding to an NTP client request from your
network or when it itself is sending NTP requests to your network. To
configure the specific source address that the reply will always use, and the
source address that requests initiated by NTP server will use, include the
source-address statement at the [edit system ntp] hierarchy level:
[edit system ntp] source-address source-address; source-address is a valid IP
address configured on one of the router or switch interfaces. When configuring
the NTP service in the management VRF (mgmt_junos), you must configure at
least one IP address on a physical or logical interface within the default
routing instance and ensure that this interface is up in order for the NTP
service to work with the mgmt_junos VRF.
47
Starting in Junos OS Release 13.3, and Junos OS Evolved Release 20.2R1 you can
configure the source address using the routing-instance statement at the [edit
system ntp source-address source-address] hierarchy level:
[edit system ntp source-address source-address] user@host# set routing-
instance routing-instance-name
For example, the following statement is configured:
[edit system ntp source-address source-address] user@host# set system ntp
source-address 12.12.12.12 routing-instance ntp-source-test
As a result, while sending NTP message through any interface in the ntp-
source-test routing instance, the source address 12.12.12.12 is used.
NOTE: The routing-instance statement is optional and if not configured, the
primary address of the interface will be used.
NOTE: If a firewall filter is applied on the loopback interface, ensure that
the source-address specified for the NTP server at the [edit system ntp]
hierarchy level is explicitly included as one of the match criteria in the
firewall filter. This enables the Junos OS to accept traffic on the loopback
interface from the specified source address. The following example shows a
firewall filter with the source address 10.0.10.100 specified in the from
statement included at the [edit firewall filter firewall-filter-name]
hierarchy:
[edit firewall filter Loopback-Interface-Firewall-Filter] term Allow-NTP {
from { source-address { 172.17.27.46/32; // IP address of the NTP server
10.0.10.100/32; // Source address specified for the NTP server } then accept;
} }
48
If no source-address is configured for the NTP server, include the primary
address of the loopback interface in the firewall filter.
NTP Configuration
The Network Time Protocol (NTP) provides the mechanisms to synchronize time
and coordinate time distribution in a large, diverse network. Debugging and
troubleshooting are much easier when the timestamps in the log files of all
the routers or switches are synchronized, because events that span the network
can be correlated with synchronous entries in multiple logs. We recommend
using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) to synchronize the system clocks of
routers, switches, and other network equipment. To configure NTP: 1. Configure
Junos OS to retrieve the time when it first boots up.
Use the boot-server statement with the IP address of your NTP server. If DNS
is configured, you can use a domain name instead of an IP address.
[edit system ntp] user@host# set boot-server (name | ip-address)
For example, set an IP address of 172.16.1.1 for your NTP server.
[edit system ntp] user@host# set boot-server 172.16.1.1
For example, set a domain name. In this example, the domain name is provided
by pool.ntp.org.
[edit system ntp] user@host# set boot-server 0.north-america.pool.ntp.org 2.
(Optional) Configure one or more reference NTP servers to keep the device
synchronized with periodic updates.
49
It is a good practice to do this, as the Junos OS device can remain up for a
long time, and therefore the clock can drift.
[edit system ntp] user@host# set server (name | ip-address)
For example, set an IP address of 172.16.1.1 for your NTP server.
[edit system ntp] user@host# set server 172.16.1.1
For example, set a domain name provided by pool.ntp.org.
[edit system ntp] user@host# set server 0.north-america.pool.ntp.org 3.
(Optional) Set the local time zone to match the device’s location. Universal
Coordinated Time (UTC) is the default. Many administrators prefer to keep all
their devices configured to use the UTC time zone. This approach has the
benefit of allowing you to easily compare the time stamps of logs and other
events across a network of devices in many different time zones. On the other
hand, setting the time zone allows Junos OS to present the time in the correct
local format.
[edit system ntp] user@host# set time-zone time-zone
For example:
[edit system ntp] user@host# set time-zone America/Los_Angeles 4. Verify the
configuration.
50
Check the system uptime. This command provides the current time, when the device was last booted, when the protocols started, and when the device was last configured.
user@host> show system uptime Current time: 2013-07-25 16:33:38 PDT System
booted: 2013-07-11 17:14:25 PDT (1w6d 23:19 ago) Protocols started: 2013-07-11
17:16:35 PDT (1w6d 23:17 ago) Last configured: 2013-07-23 12:32:42 PDT (2d
04:00 ago) by user 4:33PM up 13 days, 23:19, 1 user, load averages: 0.00,
0.01, 0.00
Check the NTP server status and associations of the clocking sources used by
your device.
user@host> show ntp associations
remote
refid
st t when poll reach delay offset jitter
==============================================================================
tux.brhelwig.co .INIT.
16 – – 512 0 0.000 0.000 4000.00
user@host > show ntp status status=c011 sync_alarm, sync_unspec, 1 event,
event_restart, version=”ntpd 4.2.0-a Thu May 30 19:14:15 UTC 2013 (1)”,
processor=”i386″, system=”JUNOS13.2-20130530_ib_13_3_psd.1″, leap=11,
stratum=16, precision=-18, rootdelay=0.000, rootdispersion=5.130, peer=0,
refid=INIT, reftime=00000000.00000000 Wed, Feb 6 2036 22:28:16.000, poll=4,
clock=d59d4f2e.1793bce9 Fri, Jul 26 2013 12:40:30.092, state=1, offset=0.000,
frequency=62.303, jitter=0.004, stability=0.000
To configure NTP on the router or switch, include the ntp statement at the
[edit system] hierarchy level:
[edit system] ntp {
authentication-key number type type value password; boot-server (address |
hostname); broadcast
51
peer address
52
Overview
Debugging and troubleshooting are much easier when the timestamps in the log
files of all switches are synchronized, because events that span a network can
be correlated with synchronous entries in multiple logs. We recommend using
the Network Time Protocol (NTP) to synchronize the system clocks of your
switch and other network equipment. In this example, an administrator wants to
synchronize the time in a switch to a single time source. We recommend using
authentication to make sure that the NTP peer is trusted. The boot-server
statement identifies the server from which the initial time of day and date
are obtained when the switch boots. The server statement identifies the NTP
server used for periodic time synchronization. The authentication-key
statement specifies that an HMAC-Message Digest 5 (MD5) scheme is used to hash
the key value for authentication, which prevents the switch from synchronizing
with an attacker’s host that is posing as the time server.
Configuration
IN THIS SECTION Procedure | 52
To configure NTP:
Procedure
CLI Quick Configuration To quickly configure NTP, copy the following commands
and paste them into the switch’s terminal window:
[edit system] set ntp boot-server 10.1.4.1 set ntp server 10.1.4.2 set ntp
authentication-key 2 type md5 value “$ABC123”
53
Step-by-Step Procedure
To configure NTP : 1. Specify the boot server:
[edit system] user@switch# set ntp boot-server 10.1.4.1
2. Specify the NTP server:
[edit system] user@switch# set ntp server 10.1.4.2
3. Specify the key number, authentication type (MD5), and key for
authentication:
[edit system] user@switch# set ntp authentication-key 2 type md5 value
“$ABC123”
Results
Check the results:
[edit system] user@switch# show ntp {
boot-server 10.1.4.1; authentication-key 2 type md5 value “$ABC123″; SECRET-DATA server 10.1.4.2; }
54
Verification
IN THIS SECTION Checking the Time | 54 Displaying the NTP Peers | 55
Displaying the NTP Status | 55
To confirm that the configuration is correct, perform these tasks:
Checking the Time
Purpose Check the time that has been set on the switch.
Action Enter the show system uptime operational mode command to display the
time.
user@switch> show system uptime fpc0: ————————————————————————-Current time:
2009-06-12 12:49:03 PDT System booted: 2009-05-15 06:24:43 PDT (4w0d 06:24
ago) Protocols started: 2009-05-15 06:27:08 PDT (4w0d 06:21 ago) Last
configured: 2009-05-27 14:57:03 PDT (2w1d 21:52 ago) by admin1 12:49PM up 28
days, 6:24, 1 user, load averages: 0.05, 0.06, 0.01
Meaning The output shows that the current date and time are June 12, 2009 and
12:49:03 PDT. The switch booted 4 weeks, 6 hours, and 24 minutes ago, and its
protocols were started approximately 3 minutes before it booted. The switch
was last configured by user admin1 on May 27, 2009, and there is currently one
user logged in to the switch.
55
The output also shows that the load average is 0.05 seconds for the last
minute, 0.06 seconds for the last 5 minutes, and 0.01 seconds for the last 15
minutes.
Displaying the NTP Peers
Purpose Verify that the time has been obtained from an NTP server.
Action Enter the show ntp associations operational mode command to display the
NTP server from switch obtained its time.
user@switch> show ntp associations
remote
refid
st t when poll reach delay offset jitter
==============================================================================
*ntp.net .GPS.
1 u 414 1024 377 3.435 4.002 0.765
Meaning
The asterisk (*) in front of the NTP server name, or peer, indicates that the
time is synchronized and obtained from this server. The delay, offset, and
jitter are displayed in milliseconds.
Displaying the NTP Status
Purpose
View the configuration of the NTP server and the status of the system.
Action
Enter the show ntp status operational mode command to view the status of the
NTP.
user@switch> show ntp status status=0644 leap_none, sync_ntp, 4 events,
event_peer/strat_chg, version=”ntpd 4.2.0-a Mon Apr 13 19:09:05 UTC 2009 (1)”,
processor=”powerpc”, system=”JUNOS9.5R1.8″, leap=00, stratum=2, precision=-18,
rootdelay=2.805, rootdispersion=42.018, peer=48172,
56
refid=192.168.28.5, reftime=cddd397a.60e6d7bf Fri, Jun 12 2009 13:30:50.378,
poll=10, clock=cddd3b1b.ec5a2bb4 Fri, Jun 12 2009 13:37:47.923, state=4,
offset=3.706, frequency=-23.018, jitter=1.818, stability=0.303
Meaning
The output shows status information about the switch and the NTP.
NTP Authentication Keys
Time synchronization can be authenticated to ensure that the switch obtains
its time services only from known sources. By default, network time
synchronization is unauthenticated. The switch will synchronize to whatever
system appears to have the most accurate time. We strongly encourage you to
configure authentication of network time services. To authenticate other time
servers, include the trusted-key statement at the [edit system ntp] hierarchy
level. The trusted keys refer to the configured key that is trusted and used
by NTP for secure clock synchronization. Any configured key not referenced in
the trusted-key is not qualified and is rejected by NTP. Only time servers
that transmit network time packets containing one of the specified key numbers
are eligible to be synchronized. Additionally, the key needs to match the
value configured for that key number. Other systems can synchronize to the
local switch without being authenticated.
[edit system ntp] trusted-key[ key-numbers ];
Each key can be any 32-bit unsigned integer except 0. Include the key option
in the peer, server, or broadcast statements to transmit the specified
authentication key when transmitting packets. The key is necessary if the
remote system has authentication enabled so that it can synchronize to the
local system. To define the authentication keys, include the authentication-
key statement at the [edit system ntp] hierarchy level:
[edit system ntp] authentication-key key-number type type value password;
57
number is the key number, type is the authentication type (only Message Digest
5 [MD5] , SHA1, and SHA2-256 are supported), and password is the password for
this key. The key number, type, and password must match on all systems using
that particular key for authentication. There must be no space in the password
for configuring the Network Time Protocol (NTP) authentication-key.
Configure Devices to Listen to Broadcast Messages Using NTP
When you are using NTP, you can configure the local router or switch to listen
for broadcast messages on the local network to discover other servers on the
same subnet by including the broadcast-client statement at the [edit system
ntp] hierarchy level:
[edit system ntp] broadcast-client;
When the router or switch detects a broadcast message for the first time, it
measures the nominal network delay using a brief client-server exchange with
the remote server. It then enters broadcast client mode, in which it listens
for, and synchronizes to, succeeding broadcast messages. To avoid accidental
or malicious disruption in this mode, both the local and remote systems must
use authentication and the same trusted key and key identifier.
Configure Devices to Listen to Multicast Messages Using NTP
When you are using NTP, you can configure the local router or switch to listen
for multicast messages on the local network to discover other servers on the
same subnet by including the multicast-client statement at the [edit system
ntp] hierarchy level:
[edit system ntp] multicast-client
58
When the router or switch receives a multicast message for the first time, it
measures the nominal network delay using a brief client-server exchange with
the remote server. It then enters multicast client mode, in which it listens
for, and synchronizes to, succeeding multicast messages.
You can specify one or more IP addresses. (You must specify an address, not a
hostname.) If you do, the router or switch joins those multicast groups. If
you do not specify any addresses, the software uses 224.0.1.1.
To avoid accidental or malicious disruption in this mode, both the local and
remote systems must use authentication and the same trusted key and key
identifier.
5 CHAPTER
Configuring SSH and Console Connection
Understanding FIPS Authentication Methods | 60 Configuring a System Login
Message and Announcement | 61 Limiting the Number of User Login Attempts for
SSH Sessions | 62 Configuring SSH on the Evaluated Configuration | 63
60
Understanding FIPS Authentication Methods
IN THIS SECTION Username and Password Authentication over the Console and SSH
| 60 Username and Public Key Authentication over SSH | 61
The Juniper Networks Junos operating system (Junos OS) running in FIPS mode of
operation allows a wide range of capabilities for users, and authentication is
role-based. The following types of role-based authentication are supported in
the FIPS mode of operation: · “Username and Password Authentication over the
Console and SSH” on page 60 · “Username and Public Key Authentication over
SSH” on page 61
Username and Password Authentication over the Console and SSH
In this authentication method, the user is requested to enter the username and
password. The device enforces the user to enter a minimum of 10 characters
password that is chosen from the 96 humanreadable ASCII characters.
NOTE: The maximum password length is 20 characters.
In this method, the device enforces a timed access mechanism–for example,
first two failed attempts to enter the correct password (assuming 0 time to
process), no timed access is enforced. When the user enters the password for
the third time, the module enforces a 5 second delay. Each failed attempt
thereafter results in an additional 5 second delay above the previous failed
attempt. For example, if the fourth failed attempt is a 10 second delay, then
the fifth failed attempt is a 15 second delay, the sixth failed attempt is a
20 second delay, and the seventh failed attempt is a 25 second delay.
Therefore, this leads to a maximum of seven possible attempts in a 1 minute
period for each getty active terminal. So, the best approach for the attacker
would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts, and wait for a new getty to be
spawned. This would allow the attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per
minute (576 attempts per hour or 60 minutes). This would be rounded off to 9
attempts per minute, because there is no such thing as 0.6 attempts. Thus the
probability of a successful random attempt is
61
1/9610, which is less than 1/1 million. The probability of a success with
multiple consecutive attempts in a 1 minute period is 9/(9610), which is less
than 1/100,000.
Username and Public Key Authentication over SSH
In SSH public key authentication, you provide the username and validate the
ownership of the private key corresponding to the public key stored on the
server. The device supports ECDSA (P-256, P-384, and P-521) and RSA (2048,
3072, and 4092 modulus bit length) key-types. The probability of a success
with multiple consecutive attempts in a 1-minute period is 5.6e7/(2128).
NOTE: The ssh-rsa authentication method is one of the allowed algorithms in
FIPS mode.
Configuring a System Login Message and Announcement
A system login message appears before the user logs in and a system login
announcement appears after the user logs in. By default, no login message or
announcement is displayed on the device. The administrator is required to
configure a login message and announcement for Common Criteria compliance. To
configure a system login message, use the following command:
[edit] user@host# set system login message login-message-banner-text To
configure system announcement, use the following command:
[edit] user@host# set system login announcement system-announcement-text
NOTE:
62
· If the message text contains any spaces, enclose it in quotation marks. ·
You can format the message using the following special characters:
· n–New line · t–Horizontal tab · ‘–Single quotation mark · “–Double quotation
mark · \–Backslash
Limiting the Number of User Login Attempts for SSH Sessions
A remote administrator may login to a device through SSH. Administrator
credentials are stored locally on the device. If the remote administrator
presents a valid username and password, access to the TOE is granted. If the
credentials are invalid, the TOE allows the authentication to be retried after
an interval that starts after 1 second and increases exponentially. If the
number of authentication attempts exceed the configured maximum, no
authentication attempts are accepted for a configured time interval. When the
interval expires, authentication attempts are again accepted. You can
configure the device to limit the number of attempts to enter a password while
logging through SSH. Using the following command, the connection can be
terminated if a user fails to login after a specified number of attempts:
[edit system login] user@host# set retry-options tries-before-disconnect
63
You can also configure a delay, in seconds, before a user can try to enter a
password after a failed attempt.
[edit system login] user@host# set retry-options backoff-threshold
[edit system login] user@host# set retry-options backoff-factor
Configuring SSH on the Evaluated Configuration
SSH is an allowed remote management interface in the evaluated configuration.
This topic describes how to configure SSH on the device. 1. Before you begin,
log in with your root account on the device running Junos OS Release 22.2R1
and
edit the configuration.
NOTE: The commands shown configure SSH to use all of the allowed cryptographic
algorithms.
NOTE: You can enter the configuration commands in any order and commit all the
commands at once.
To configure SSH on the TOE:
64
1. Specify the permissible SSH host-key algorithms.
[edit system services ssh] user@host# set hostkey-algorithm ssh-ecdsa
user@host# set hostkey-algorithm ssh-rsa 2. Specify the SSH key-exchange
algorithms.
[edit system services ssh] user@host#set key-exchange [ ecdh-sha2-nistp256
ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdh-sha2-nistp521 Diffiehellman-group14-sha1 ] 3. Specify
all the permissible message authentication code algorithms.
[edit system services ssh] user@host#set macs [ hmac-sha1 hmac-sha2-256 hmac-
sha2-512 ] 4. Specify the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2.
[edit system services ssh] user@host#set ciphers [ aes128-cbc aes256-cbc
aes128-ctr aes256-ctr ] RELATED DOCUMENTATION Understanding FIPS
Authentication Methods | 60 Limiting the Number of User Login Attempts for SSH
Sessions | 62
6 CHAPTER
Configuring the Remote Syslog Server
Sample Syslog Server Configuration on a Linux System | 66 Forwarding Logs to
the External Syslog Server | 73
66
Sample Syslog Server Configuration on a Linux System
IN THIS SECTION Configuring Event Logging to a Local File | 66 Configuring
Event Logging to a Remote Server | 67 Configuring Event Logging to a Remote
Server when Initiating the Connection from the Remote Server | 67
A secure Junos OS environment requires auditing of events and storing them in
a local audit file. The recorded events are simultaneously sent to an external
syslog server. A syslog server receives the syslog messages streamed from the
device. The syslog server must have an SSH client with NETCONF support
configured to receive the streamed syslog messages. The NDcPP logs capture the
events, few of them are listed below: · Committed changes · Login and logout
of users · Failure to establish an SSH session · Establishment or termination
of an SSH session · Changes to the system time
Configuring Event Logging to a Local File
You can configure storing of messages to a local file and the level of detail
to be recorded with the syslog statement. This example stores logs in a file
named syslog:
[edit system] syslog {
file syslog; }
67
Configuring Event Logging to a Remote Server
Configure the export of audit information to a secure, remote server by
setting up an event trace monitor that sends event log messages by using
NETCONF over SSH to the remote system event logging server. The following
procedures show the configuration needed to send system log messages to a
secure external server by using NETCONF over SSH.
Configuring Event Logging to a Remote Server when Initiating the Connection
from the Remote Server
The following procedure describes the steps to configure event logging to a
remote server when the SSH connection to the TOE is initiated from the remote
system log server. 1. Generate an RSA public key on the remote syslog server.
$ ssh-keygen -b 2048 -t rsa -C ‘syslog-monitor key pair’ -f ~/.ssh/syslog-
monitor You will be prompted to enter the desired passphrase. The storage
location for the syslog-monitor key pair is displayed. 2. On the TOE, create a
class named monitor that has permission to trace events.
[edit] user@host# set system login class monitor permissions trace 3. Create a
user named syslog-mon with the class monitor, and with authentication that
uses the syslogmonitor key pair from the key pair file located on the remote
syslog server.
[edit] user@host# set system login user syslog-mon class monitor
authentication ssh-rsa public key from syslog-monitor key pair 4. Set up
NETCONF with SSH.
[edit] user@host# set system services netconf ssh
68
5. Configure syslog to log all the messages at /var/log/messages.
[edit] user@host# set system syslog file messages any any user@host# commit
6. On the remote system log server, start up the SSH agent. The start up is
required to simplify the handling of the syslog-monitor key.
$ eval ssh-agent
7. On the remote syslog server, add the syslog-monitor key
pair to the SSH agent.
$ ssh-add ~/.ssh/syslog-monitor
You will be prompted to enter the desired passphrase. Enter the same
passphrase used in Step 1. 8. After logging in to the external_syslog_server
session, establish a tunnel to the device and start
NETCONF.
user@host# ssh syslog-mon@NDcPP_TOE -s netconf > test.out
9. After NETCONF is established, configure a system log events message
stream. This RPC will cause the NETCONF service to start transmitting messages
over the SSH connection that is established.
69
Your identification has been saved in /home/host/.ssh/syslog-monitor.
Your public key has been saved in /home/host/.ssh/syslog-monitor.pub.
The key fingerprint is:
ef:75:d7:68:c5:ad:8d:6f:5e:7a:7e:9b:3d:f1:4d:3f syslog-monitor key pair
The key’s randomart image is:
+–[ RSA 2048]—-+
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
..|
|
S
+|
|
. Bo|
|
. . *.X|
|
. . o E@|
|
. .BX|
+—————–+
[host@linux]$ cat /home/host/.ssh/syslog-monitor.pub
ssh-rsa
AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQCrUREJUBpjwAoIgRrGy9zgt+
D2pikk3Q/Wdf8I5vr+njeqJhCx2bUAkrRbYXNILQQAZbg7kLfi/8TqqL
eon4HOP2e6oCSorKdx/GrOTzLONL4fh0EyuSAk8bs5JuwWNBUokV025
gzpGFsBusGnlj6wqqJ/sjFsMmfxyCkbY+pUWb8m1/A9YjOFT+6esw+9S
tF6Gbg+VpbYYk/Oday4z+z7tQHRFSrxj2G92aoliVDBLJparEMBc8w
LdSUDxmgBTM2oadOmm+kreBUQjrmr6775RJn9H9YwIxKOxGm4SFnX/Vl4
R+lZ9RqmKH2wodIEM34K0wXEHzAzNZ01oLmaAVqT
syslog-monitor key pair
[host@linux]$ eval ssh-agent
Agent pid 1453
[host@linux]$ ssh-add ~/.ssh/syslog-monitor
Enter passphrase for /home/host/.ssh/syslog-monitor:
Identity added: /home/host/.ssh/syslog-monitor (/home/host/.ssh/syslog- monitor)
Net configuration channel
host@linux]$ ssh syslog-mon@starfire -s netconf>test.out host@linux]$ cat
test.out this is NDcPP test device
<!– No zombies were killed during the creation of this user interface -<!–
user syslog-mon, class j-monitor ->
70
71
<session-id4129/session-id>
The following output shows that the local syslogs and remote syslogs received are similar.
Local : an 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: Redundancy interface management process checking new configuration Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_START: Starting child ‘/usr/sbin/rdd’ Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_STATUS: Cleanup child ‘/usr/sbin/rdd’, PID 4317, status 0 Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: Dynamic flow capture service checking new configuration Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_START: Starting child ‘/usr/sbin/dfcd’ Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_STATUS: Cleanup child ‘/usr/sbin/dfcd’, PID 4318, status 0 Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: Connectivity fault management process checking new configuration Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_START: Starting child ‘/usr/sbin/cfmd’ Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_STATUS: Cleanup child ‘/usr/sbin/cfmd’, PID 4319, status 0 Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: Layer 2 address flooding and learning process checking new configuration Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_START: Starting child ‘/usr/sbin/l2ald’ Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_STATUS: Cleanup child ‘/usr/sbin/l2ald’, PID 4320, status 0 Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: Layer 2 Control Protocol process checking new configuration Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_START: Starting child ‘/usr/sbin/l2cpd’ Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire l2cp[4321]: Initializing PNAC state machines Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire l2cp[4321]: Initializing PNAC state machines complete Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire l2cp[4321]: Initialized 802.1X module and state machinesJan 20 17:09:30 starfire l2cp[4321]: Read acess profile () config Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_STATUS: Cleanup child ‘/usr/sbin/l2cpd’, PID 4321, status 0 Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: Multicast Snooping process checking new configuration Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_START: Starting child ‘/usr/sbin/mcsnoopd’ Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_STATUS: Cleanup child ‘/usr/sbin/mcsnoopd’, PID 4325, status 0 Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: commit wrapup…
72
Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in
progress: activating ‘/var/etc/ntp.conf’ Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]:
UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: start ffp activate Jan 20
17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_START: Starting child ‘/usr/sbin/ffp’
Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire ffp[4326]: “dynamic-profiles”: No change to
profiles………………………………
Remote : an 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit
operation in progress: Redundancy interface management process checking new
configuration Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_START: Starting
child ‘/usr/sbin/rdd’ Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_STATUS:
Cleanup child ‘/usr/sbin/rdd’, PID 4317, status 0 Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire
mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: Dynamic flow
capture service checking new configuration Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]:
UI_CHILD_START: Starting child ‘/usr/sbin/dfcd’ Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire
mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_STATUS: Cleanup child ‘/usr/sbin/dfcd’, PID 4318, status 0
Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in
progress: Connectivity fault management process checking new configuration Jan
20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_START: Starting child
‘/usr/sbin/cfmd’ Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_STATUS: Cleanup
child ‘/usr/sbin/cfmd’, PID 4319, status 0 Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]:
UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: Layer 2 address flooding and
learning process checking new configuration Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire
mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_START: Starting child ‘/usr/sbin/l2ald’ Jan 20 17:09:30
starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_STATUS: Cleanup child ‘/usr/sbin/l2ald’, PID
4320, status 0 Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit
operation in progress: Layer 2 Control Protocol process checking new
configuration Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_START: Starting
child ‘/usr/sbin/l2cpd’ Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire l2cp[4321]: Initializing PNAC
state machines Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire l2cp[4321]: Initializing PNAC state
machines complete Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire l2cp[4321]: Initialized 802.1X
module and state machinesJan 20 17:09:30 starfire l2cp[4321]: Read acess
profile () config Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_STATUS: Cleanup
child ‘/usr/sbin/l2cpd’, PID 4321, status 0 Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire
mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: Multicast
Snooping process checking new configuration Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire
mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_START: Starting child ‘/usr/sbin/mcsnoopd’ Jan 20 17:09:30
starfire mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_STATUS: Cleanup child ‘/usr/sbin/mcsnoopd’, PID
73
4325, status 0 Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit
operation in progress: commit wrapup… Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]:
UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: activating
‘/var/etc/ntp.conf’ Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire mgd[4186]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS:
Commit operation in progress: start ffp activate Jan 20 17:09:30 starfire
mgd[4186]: UI_CHILD_START: Starting child ‘/usr/sbin/ffp’ Jan 20 17:09:30
starfire ffp[4326]: “dynamic-profiles”: No change to profiles ……………
Forwarding Logs to the External Syslog Server
When the device running Junos OS is set up for an external syslog server, the
TOE forwards copies of local logs to the external syslog server and retains
local copies of all logs when the TOE is configured in event log mode. In
stream log mode, all logs except traffic logs are stored locally and can be
forwarded to an external syslog server, whereas traffic logs can only be
forwarded to an external syslog server. The connection between the device
running Junos OS and the syslog server is established on an event basis
depending on preconfiguration of what type of logs are forwarded from local to
external. When the configured condition is met, the device sends local logs to
the external syslog server.
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Sample Syslog Server Configuration on a Linux System |
66
7 CHAPTER
Configuring Audit Log Options
Configuring Audit Log Options in the Evaluated Configuration | 75 Sample Code
Audits of Configuration Changes | 76
75
Configuring Audit Log Options in the Evaluated Configuration
IN THIS SECTION Configuring Audit Log Options for SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200,
and SRX4600 Devices | 75
The following section describes how to configure audit log options in the
evaluated configuration.
Configuring Audit Log Options for SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600
Devices
To configure audit log options for SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, SRX4600 devices:
- Specify the number of files to be archived in the system logging facility.
[edit system syslog] root@host#set archive files 2 2. Specify the file in which to log data.
[edit system syslog] root@host#set file syslog any any 3. Specify the size of files to be archived.
[edit system syslog] root@host#set file syslog archive size 10000000
76
4. Log system messages in a structured format.
[edit system syslog] root@host#set file syslog structured-data 5. Configure
security log events in the audit log buffer.
[edit] root@host#set security log cache 6. Specify how to process and export
security logs.
[edit] root@host#set security log mode event
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Sample Code Audits of Configuration Changes | 76
Sample Code Audits of Configuration Changes
This sample code audits all changes to the configuration secret data and sends
the logs to a file named syslog:
[edit system] syslog {
file syslog { authorization info; change-log info; interactive-commands info;
} }
77
This sample code expands the scope of the minimum audit to audit all changes
to the configuration, not just secret data, and sends the logs to a file named
syslog:
[edit system] syslog {
file syslog { any any; authorization info; change-log any; interactive-
commands info; kernel info; pfe info;
} }
Example: System Logging of Configuration Changes
This example shows a sample configuration and makes changes to users and
secret data. It then shows the information sent to the audit server when the
secret data is added to the original configuration and committed with the load
command.
[edit system] location {
country-code US; building B1; } … login { message “UNAUTHORIZED USE OF THIS
ROUTERntIS STRICTLY PROHIBITED!”;
user admin { uid 2000; class super-user;
authentication { encrypted-password “$ABC123”; # SECRET-DATA
} } password {
format md5; } } radius-server 192.0.2.15 {
78
secret “$ABC123” # SECRET-DATA } services {
ssh; } syslog {
user *{ any emergency;
} file syslog {
any notice; authorization info; } file interactive-commands { interactive-
commands any; } } … …
The new configuration changes the secret data configuration statements and
adds a new user.
user@host# show | compare
[edit system login user admin authentication]
encrypted-password “$ABC123”; # SECRET-DATA
+ encrypted-password “$ABC123”; # SECRET-DATA
[edit system login]
+ user admin2 {
uid 2001;
class operator;
authentication {
encrypted-password “$ABC123”;
SECRET-DATA
}
+ }
[edit system radius-server 192.0.2.15]
secret “$ABC123”; # SECRET-DATA
+ secret “$ABC123”; # SECRET-DATA
79
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Configuring Audit Log Options in the Evaluated
Configuration
8 CHAPTER
Configuring Event Logging
Event Logging Overview | 81 Interpreting Event Messages | 86 Logging Changes
to Secret Data | 87 Login and Logout Events Using SSH | 89 Logging of Audit
Startup | 89
81
Event Logging Overview
The evaluated configuration requires the auditing of configuration changes through the system log. In addition, Junos OS can: · Send automated responses to audit events (syslog entry creation). · Allow authorized managers to examine audit logs. · Send audit files to external servers. · Allow authorized managers to return the system to a known state. The logging for the evaluated configuration must capture the events. The logging events are listed below: Table 4 on page 81 shows sample for syslog auditing for NDcPPv2: Table 4: Auditable Events
Requirement
Auditable Events
Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1
None
None
FAU_GEN.2
None
None
FAU_STG_EXT.1
None
None
FAU_STG.1
None
None
FCS_CKM.1
None
None
FCS_CKM.2
None
None
FCS_CKM.4
None
None
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption
None
None
82
Table 4: Auditable Events (Continued)
Requirement
Auditable Events
Additional Audit Record Contents
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
None
None
FCS_COP.1/Hash
None
None
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
None
None
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
None
None
FDP_RIP.2
None
None
FIA_AFL.1
Unsuccessful login attempts limit is Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
met or exceeded.
address).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1
None
None
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
All use of identification and authentication mechanism.
Provided user identity, origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU_EXT.2
All use of identification and authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU.7
None
None
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate
Any attempt to initiate a manual update.
None
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData
All management activities of TSF data
None
FMT_SMF.1
None
None
FMT_SMR.2
None
None
83
Table 4: Auditable Events (Continued)
Requirement
Auditable Events
Additional Audit Record Contents
FPT_SKP_EXT.1
None
None
FPT_APW_EXT.1
None
None
FPT_TST_EXT.1
None
None
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success or failure)
None
FPT_STM.1
Discontinuous changes to time either Administrator actuated or changed through an automated process.
For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time. Origin of the attempt to change time for success and failure (such as, IP address).
FTA_SSL_EXT.1
The termination of a local interactive session by the session locking mechanism.
None
FTA_SSL.3
The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism.
None
FTA_SSL.4
The termination of an interactive session.
None
FTA_TAB.1
None
None
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
Failure to establish an SSH session Reason for failure
FTP_ITC.1
Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions.
Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt.
84
Table 4: Auditable Events (Continued)
Requirement
Auditable Events
Additional Audit Record Contents
FTP_TRP.1/Admin
Initiation of the trusted path. Termination of the trusted path. Failure of the trusted path functions.
None
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
Failure to establish an SSH session Reason for failure
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev
Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate
Reason for failure
FIA_X509_EXT.2
None
None
FIA_X509_EXT.3
None
None
FMT_MOF.1/Functions
Modification of the behaviour of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity, the handling of audit data, the audit functionality when Local Audit Storage Space is full.
None
FMT_MOF.1/Services
Starting and stopping of services. None
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys
Management of cryptographic keys. None
FFW_RUL_EXT.1
Application of rules configured with the `log’ operation
Source and destination addresses. Source and destination ports. Transport Layer Protocol TOE Interface.
Indication of packets dropped due to too much network traffic
TOE interface that is unable to process packets. Identifier of rule causing packet drop.
85
Table 4: Auditable Events (Continued)
Requirement
Auditable Events
Additional Audit Record Contents
FFW_RUL_EXT.2
None
None
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1
Session Establishment with peer
Entire packet contents of packets transmitted/received during session establishment.
FIA_X509_EXT.1
Session establishment with CA
Entire packet contents of packets transmitted/received during session establishment.
FPF_RUL_EXT.1
Application of rules configured with the `log’ operation
Source and destination addresses. Source and destination ports. Transport Layer Protocol TOE Interface.
Indication of packets dropped due to too much network traffic.
TOE interface that is unable to process packets.
In addition, Juniper Networks recommends that logging also: · Capture all changes to the configuration. · Store logging information remotely.
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Interpreting Event Messages | 86
86
Interpreting Event Messages
The following output shows a sample event message.
Jul 24 17:43:28 router1 mgd[4163]: UI_CFG_AUDIT_SET_SECRET: User ‘admin’ set: [system radiusserver 1.2.3.4 secret]
Table 5 on page 86 describes the fields for an event message. If the system
logging utility cannot determine the value in a particular field, a hyphen ( –
) appears instead.
Table 5: Fields in Event Messages
Field
timestamp
Description
Examples
Time when the message was generated, in one of two representations:
· MMM-DD HH:MM:SS.MS+/-HH:MM, is the month, day, hour,
minute, second and millisecond in local time. The hour and minute that follows
the plus sign (+) or minus sign (-) is the offset of the local time zone from
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
Jul 24 17:43:28 is the timestamp expressed as local time in the United States. 2012-07-24T09:17:15.719Z is 9:17 AM UTC on 24 July 2012.
· YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS.MSZ is the year, month, day, hour,
minute, second and millisecond in UTC.
hostname
Name of the host that originally generated the message. router1
process
Name of the Junos OS process that generated the message.
processID
UNIX process ID (PID) of the Junos OS process that generated the message.
TAG
Junos OS system log message tag, which uniquely
identifies the message.
mgd 4153 UI_DBASE_LOGOUT_EVENT
Table 5: Fields in Event Messages (Continued)
Field
Description
username
Username of the user initiating the event.
message-text English-language description of the event .
87
Examples “admin” set: [system radius-server 1.2.3.4 secret]
Logging Changes to Secret Data
The following are examples of audit logs of events that change the secret
data.
Load Merge
When a load merge command is issued to merge the contents of the example
Common Criteria configuration with the contents of the original configuration,
the following audit logs are created concerning the secret data:
Jul 24 17:43:28 router1 mgd[4163]: UI_CFG_AUDIT_SET_SECRET: User ‘admin’ set:
[system radiusserver 1.2.3.4 secret] Jul 24 17:43:28 router1 mgd[4163]:
UI_CFG_AUDIT_SET_SECRET: User ‘admin’ set: [system login user admin
authentication encrypted-password] Jul 24 17:43:28 router1 mgd[4163]:
UI_CFG_AUDIT_SET_SECRET: User ‘admin’ set: [system login user admin2
authentication encrypted-password] Load Replace
When a load replace command is issued to replace the contents of the example
Common Criteria configuration with the contents of the original configuration,
the following audit logs are created concerning the secret data:
Jul 24 18:29:09 router1 mgd[4163]: UI_CFG_AUDIT_SET_SECRET: User ‘admin’
replace: [system radius-server 1.2.3.4 secret] Jul 24 18:29:09 router1
mgd[4163]: UI_CFG_AUDIT_SET_SECRET: User ‘admin’ replace: [system login user
admin authentication encrypted-password]
88
Jul 24 18:29:09 router1 mgd[4163]: UI_CFG_AUDIT_SET_SECRET: User ‘admin’
replace: [system login user admin authentication encrypted-password] Load
Override
When a load override command is issued to override the contents of the example
Common Criteria configuration with the contents of the original configuration,
the following audit logs are created concerning the secret data:
Jul 25 14:25:51 router1 mgd[4153]: UI_LOAD_EVENT: User ‘admin’ is performing a
‘load override’ Jul 25 14:25:51 router1 mgd[4153]: UI_CFG_AUDIT_OTHER: User
‘admin’ override: CC_config2.txt Jul 25 14:25:51 router1 mgd[4153]:
UI_CFG_AUDIT_SET_SECRET: User ‘admin’ set: [system radiusserver 1.2.3.4
secret] Jul 25 14:25:51 router1 mgd[4153]: UI_CFG_AUDIT_SET_SECRET: User
‘admin’ set: [system login user admin authentication encrypted-password] Jul
25 14:25:51 router1 mgd[4153]: UI_CFG_AUDIT_SET_SECRET: User ‘admin’ set:
[system login user admin authentication encrypted-password] Load Update When a
load update command is issued to update the contents of the example Common
Criteria configuration with the contents of the original configuration, the
following audit logs are created concerning the secret data:
Jul 25 14:31:03 router1 mgd[4153]: UI_LOAD_EVENT: User ‘admin’ is performing a
‘load update’ Jul 25 14:31:03 router1 mgd[4153]: UI_CFG_AUDIT_OTHER: User
‘admin’ update: CC_config2.txt Jul 25 14:31:03 router1 mgd[4153]:
UI_CFG_AUDIT_SET_SECRET: User ‘admin’ set: [system radiusserver 1.2.3.4
secret] Jul 25 14:31:03 router1 mgd[4153]: UI_CFG_AUDIT_OTHER: User ‘admin’
deactivate: [system radiusserver 1.2.3.4 secret] “” Jul 25 14:31:03 router1
mgd[4153]: UI_CFG_AUDIT_SET_SECRET: User ‘admin’ set: [system login user admin
authentication encrypted-password] Jul 25 14:31:03 router1 mgd[4153]:
UI_CFG_AUDIT_OTHER: User ‘admin’ deactivate: [system login user admin
authentication encrypted-password] “” Jul 25 14:31:03 router1 mgd[4153]:
UI_CFG_AUDIT_SET_SECRET: User ‘admin’ set: [system login user test
authentication encrypted-password] Jul 25 14:31:03 router1 mgd[4153]:
UI_CFG_AUDIT_OTHER: User ‘admin’ deactivate: [system login user test
authentication encrypted-password] “”
For more information about configuring parameters and managing log files, see
the Junos OS System Log Messages Reference.
89
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Interpreting Event Messages | 86
Login and Logout Events Using SSH
System log messages are generated whenever a user successfully or unsuccessfully attempts SSH access. Logout events are also recorded. For example, the following logs are the result of two failed authentication attempts, then a successful one, and finally a logout:
Dec 20 23:17:35 Dec 20 23:17:42 Dec 20 23:17:53 Dec 20 23:17:53
Dec 20 23:17:53 Dec 20 23:17:56 Dec 20 23:17:56
bilbo sshd[16645]: Failed password for op from 172.17.58.45 port 1673 ssh2
bilbo sshd[16645]: Failed password for op from 172.17.58.45 port 1673 ssh2
bilbo sshd[16645]: Accepted password for op from 172.17.58.45 port 1673 ssh2
bilbo mgd[16648]: UI_AUTH_EVENT: Authenticated user ‘op’ at permission level
‘j-operator’ bilbo mgd[16648]: UI_LOGIN_EVENT: User ‘op’ login, class
‘j-operator’ [16648] bilbo mgd[16648]: UI_CMDLINE_READ_LINE: User ‘op’,
command ‘quit ‘ bilbo mgd[16648]: UI_LOGOUT_EVENT: User ‘op’ logout
RELATED DOCUMENTATION Interpreting Event Messages | 86
Logging of Audit Startup
The audit information logged includes startups of Junos OS. This in turn identifies the startup events of the audit system, which cannot be independently disabled or enabled. For example, if Junos OS is restarted, the audit log contains the following information:
Dec 20 23:17:35 Dec 20 23:17:35 Dec 20 23:17:35 status=1
bilbo syslogd: exiting on signal 14 bilbo syslogd: restart bilbo syslogd /kernel: Dec 20 23:17:35 init: syslogd (PID 19128) exited with
90
Dec 20 23:17:42 bilbo /kernel: Dec 20 23:17:53 init: syslogd (PID 19200)
started
9 CHAPTER
Configuring a Secure Logging Channel
Creating a Secure Logging Channel | 92
92
Creating a Secure Logging Channel
IN THIS SECTION Configuring a Trusted Path or Channel Between a Device Running
Junos OS and a Remote External Storage Server | 93
This section describes how to place the device in an evaluated configuration to provide an encrypted communication channel over an IPsec VPN tunnel, between a device running Junos OS and a remote external storage server (syslog server).
NOTE: The ssh-rsa authentication method is one of the allowed algorithms in FIPS mode.
Table 6 on page 92 lists all the supported algorithms for the IPsec VPN
tunnel. Table 6: IPsec VPN Tunnel Supported Algorithms
IKE Phase1 Proposal
Authentication Method Authentication Algorithm DH Group
Encryption Algorithm
pre-shared-keys rsa-signatures-2048 ecdsa-signatures-256 ecdsa-signatures-384
sha-256 sha-384
group14 group19 group20 group24
aes-128-cbc aes-128-gcm aes-192-cbc aes-256-cbc aes-256-gcm
93
IPSec Phase2 Proposal
Authentication Algorithm
DH Group (PFS)
hmac-sha1-96 hmac-sha-256-128
group14 group19 group20 group24
Encryption Method
Encryption Algorithm
ESP
aes-128-cbc
aes-128-gcm
aes-192-cbc
aes-192-gcm
aes-256-cbc
aes-256-gcm
Configuring a Trusted Path or Channel Between a Device Running Junos OS and a
Remote External Storage Server
This section describes the configuration details required to provide an
encrypted communication channel between a device running Junos OS and the
remote external storage server through an IPsec VPN tunnel.
NOTE: The remote external storage server is a Linux-based syslog server on
which the IPsec VPN Tunnel is terminated at the outbound interface Eth1. The
log data transferred from the device is sent to the syslog termination
interface Eth2 and the StrongSwan application to provide the IPsec VPN
capability.
Table 7 on page 94 lists the IPsec VPN tunnel details used in this example.
94
Table 7: IPsec VPN Tunnel Information Phase 1 Proposal (P1, IKE)
Phase 2 Proposal (P2, IPSec)
Authenticat ion Method
Authenticat ion Algorithm
DH Group
Encryption Algorithm
Authenticat ion Algorithm
DH Group (PFS)
Encryption Method
Encryption Algorithm
pre-shared- sha-256
group14
aes-128- hmac-
group14
ESP
keys
cbc
sha1-96
aes-128cbc
Figure 1 on page 94 illustrates the encrypted communication channel between a device running Junos OS and a remote external storage server. An IPsec tunnel is established between a devices egress interface (Intf-1) and a remote syslog server outbound interface (Eth1). Data is then forwarded internally on the remote external storage server from its outbound interface Eth1; that is, the VPN endpoint to Eth2.
Figure 1: IPsec VPN Tunnel
Table 8 on page 95 provides the interface and IP configuration details used in this example.
95
Table 8: Interface and IP Configuration Details for the Trusted Path
Device Running Junos OS
Remote Storage Server
IP Address: “Intf-2” interface: GE-0/0/1 IP Address: 198.51.100.2 “Intf-1” interface: GE-0/0/2 – IP Address: 198.51.100.1 Enable: Syslog logging to remote syslog server
IP Address: Eth1: 198.51.100.3 Eth2: 203.0.113.1 Gateway Eth1: 198.51.100.1 Tools: SSH and Strongswan (for IPsec VPN)
To configure the trusted path or channel between a device running Junos OS and
a remote external storage server:
1. Enable stream logging for traffic logs.
[edit security] user@host#set log cache user@host#set log mode event
user@host#set log source-address 198.51.100.2 user@host#set log stream STREAM
category all user@host#set log stream STREAM host 203.0.113.1
NOTE: 192.168.2.1 is the IP address of the syslog server outbound interface at which the IPsec VPN tunnel is terminated, and 20.20.20.2 is the IP address
References
- Welcome to nginx!
- tftp.org is available for purchase - Sedo.com
- commoncriteriaportal.org/
- Welcome to the home of the Network Time Protocol (NTP) Project.
- Compliance Advisor | Juniper Networks Pathfinder
- Common Criteria Certifications | Juniper Networks Pathfinder Compliance Advisor
- FIPS Certifications | Juniper Networks Pathfinder Compliance Advisor
- CEC Juniper Community
- CEC Juniper Community
- Downloads
- User Registration
- Common Criteria and FIPS Documentation Archives | Juniper Networks
- Intrusion Detection and Prevention User Guide | Junos OS | Juniper Networks
- Junos® OS Software Installation and Upgrade Guide | Junos OS | Juniper Networks
- Configure Policy-Based IPsec VPN with Certificates | Junos OS | Juniper Networks
- Installing Software on SRX Series Devices | Junos OS | Juniper Networks
- Preparing for Software Installation and Upgrade (Junos OS) | Junos OS | Juniper Networks
- Configuring Chassis Clustering on SRX Series Devices | Junos OS | Juniper Networks
- Certificate Enrollment | Junos OS | Juniper Networks
- PKI in Junos OS | Junos OS | Juniper Networks
- IDP Policy Rules and IDP Rule Bases | Junos OS | Juniper Networks
- IDP Signature Database Overview | Junos OS | Juniper Networks
- Reordering Security Policies | Junos OS | Juniper Networks
- Public Key Infrastructure Feature Guide for Security Devices - Technical Documentation - Support - Juniper Networks
- Documentation | Juniper Networks
- Disabling a Chassis Cluster | Junos OS | Juniper Networks
- Customer and Partner Stories - Network Performance Solutions and Networking Security - Juniper Networks
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